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HIGH PRICES IN THE U.S. FOR LIFE-SAVING 
DRUGS: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING THROUGH 
TORT LAW?  
Paul J. Zwier* 
Sudden exorbitant price hikes to patients who have long 
taken life-saving drugs are more and more common in today’s 
pharmaceutical market.  The anxiety caused to patients who have 
been prescribed these drugs by their doctors is predictable and 
severe.  Even when initially covered by insurance or through 
government programs, patients and their families can soon be 
made destitute by the high copays or caps on payments.  This 
Essay argues that those who buy up life-saving drugs and decide 
to raise their prices, despite their knowledge of the consequences 
to patients, are committing the torts of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
Despite challenges presented by class certification law, these 
patients should be allowed to qualify as a class for purposes of 
pursuing a price reduction in these drugs.  Through class action 
collective bargaining, courts can avoid the pitfalls of waiting for 
piecemeal legislation for consumers of individual drugs and still 
receive the advantages of free market principled pricing through 
collective bargaining.  And, in combination with legislation, 
patterned on statutes designed to address bad faith insurance 
practices, the courts can most effectively moderate high pricing 
and curtail pricing practices that may otherwise soon bankrupt 
our healthcare system. 
 
* Paul J. Zwier is a Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. Many thanks 
to my Emory colleagues, David Partlett and Lisa Vertinsky, and the members of the 
Remedies Conference, held December 4, 2015, for their excellent edits and suggestions 
on an earlier version of this article. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The acts of Valeant Pharmaceuticals (Valeant) buying up the 
rights to Cuprimine (a drug used to treat Wilson’s disease), and 
raising its price,1 and of Turing Pharmaceuticals’ (Turing) buying 
up the rights to Daraprim (an AIDS and Cancer drug),2 and 
increasing its cost to more than twenty-five times its original 
price, without regard for the emotional distress caused to the 
patients that take these drugs, are common law torts.3 
Public reaction seems to be one of outrage, felt by patients4 
and prescribing physicians,5 and even reaching into current 
political debates.6  As of the time of the date of this Essay, there 
are two different, Senate-led efforts on the subject of high-priced 
 
 1.  See Andrew Pollack & Sabrina Tavernise, A Drug Company’s Price Tactics 
Pinch Insurers and Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2015, at A1.  See also Robert Pear, 
Health Spending in the U.S. Topped $3 Trillion Last Year, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/03/us/politics/health-spending-in-us-topped-3-
trillion-last-year.html?_r=0 (“Retail spending on prescription drugs increased sharply 
last year, rising 12.2 percent to $297.7 billion.”). 
 2.  Linda A. Johnson, Exorbitant drug price hikes are becoming more common, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 27, 2015), available at 
http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_28879430/exorbitant-drug-price-hikes-are-
becoming-more-common; Rafi Mohammed, It’s Time to Rein in Exorbitant 
Pharmaceutical Prices, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 15, 2015, https://hbr.org/2015/09/its-
time-to-rein-in-exorbitant-pharmaceutical-prices. See generally John Russell, Turing 
won’t cut list price of lifesaving drug Daraprim sold at Walgreens, CHICAGO TRIB. (Nov. 
25, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-daraprim-price-walgreens-
1126-biz-20151125-story.html. 
 3.  To make matters worse, the EpiPen has recently been price-hiked.  Gretchen 
Morgenson, EpiPen Price Rises Could Mean More Riches for Mylan Executives, N.Y. 
Times (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/04/business/at-mylan-lets-
pretend-is-more-than-a-game.html?_r=1. 
 4.  Andrew Pollack & Sabrina Tavernise, Valeant’s Drug Price Strategy Enriches 
It, but Infuriates Patients and Lawmakers, N.Y. Times (Oct. 4, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/05/business/valeants-drug-price-strategy-enriches-
it-but-infuriates-patients-and-lawmakers.html?_r=0. 
 5.  Andrew Pollack, Drug Goes From $13.50 a Tablet to $750, Overnight, N.Y. 
Times (Sept. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/business/a-he-overnight-
increase-in-drug-price-raises-protests.html; Andrew Pollack, Big Price Increase for 
Tuberculosis Drug Is Rescinded, N.Y. Times (Sept. 21, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/22/business/big-price-incrase-for-tb-drug-is-
rescinded.html. But see Andrew Pollack, Martin Shkreli’s Arrest Gives Drug Makers 
Cover, N.Y. Times (Dec. 17, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/18/business/martin-shkreli-arrest-gives-drug-
makers-cover.html. 
 6.  Meg Tirrell & Dan Mangan, Clinton calls drug price hike ‘outrageous,’ vows 
plan, CNBC (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/09/21/clinton-calls-drug-
price-hike-outrageous-vows-plan.html. 
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drugs.7  Although the pricing of U.S. drugs is many times higher 
than that of any of its neighbors,8 and even though the U.S. 
consumer appears accustomed to high prices, the issue is whether 
there are any limits to what drug companies can charge for life-
saving drugs.  Perhaps it is time for U.S. law to make clear that 
when a company sells life-saving drugs,9 it owes more to its 
patient-consumers than to price it according to free market 
principles.  The nature of the market—lack of choices and exigent 
need—should dictate a higher degree of care by the manufacturer 
in its pricing of its product. 
Valeant purchased the rights to Cuprimine, and quadrupled 
its price overnight.10  The Mayo Clinic defines Wilson’s disease as 
a “rare, inherited disorder that causes too much copper to 
accumulate in your liver, brain and other vital organs.”11  
Symptoms of the disease typically present between ages twelve 
and twenty-three.12  When diagnosed early, Wilson’s disease is 
treatable, and many people with the disorder live long and normal 
lives.13  Cuprimine is the vital drug of choice that, while not a cure 
for the disease, makes that long life possible.14  Without 
 
 7.  Senate Hearings Investigate Rising Price of Medications, NPR (Dec. 9, 2015), 
http://www.npr.org/2015/12/09/459026284/senate-hearings-to-investigate-rising-
price-of-medications. See Andrew Pollack, Senators Condemn Big Price Increases for 
Drugs, N.Y. Times (Dec. 9, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/10/business/senators-condemn-big-price-increases-
for-drugs.html?_r=0. 
 8.  Kai Rugerri & Ellen Nolte, Pharmaceutical pricing: The use of external 
reference pricing, RAND CORP. (2013), 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR240/RAND_
RR240.pdf (comparing pharmaceutical company pricing and profits in European, 
Canadian, and other regulated markets with U.S. pharmaceutical company profits). 
 9.  Of course, one of the difficulties in designing a cause of action and a remedy 
is to defining what constitutes a life-saving drug. This Author believes that Cuprimine 
and Daraprim would qualify, as would most Cancer drugs that either fight tumors, 
control pain, or significantly improve the life span and quality of life of the patient. 
Perhaps the Canadian’s classification of drugs could also be used to help reward the 
breakthrough drug, but not one that is simply marketed by a new owner. See infra, 
note 235 and accompanying text. 
 10.  Pollack & Tavernise, supra note 1. 
 11.  Wilson’s Disease, MAYO CLINIC (Aug. 28, 2014), 
http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/wilsons-disease/basics/definition/con-
20043499. 
 12.  Id. (“Copper plays a key role in the development of healthy nerves, bones, 
collagen, and the skin pigment melanin. Normally, copper is absorbed from your food, 
and any excess is excreted through bile—a substance produced in your liver. But in 
people with Wilson’s disease, copper isn’t eliminated properly and instead 
accumulates, possibly to a life-threatening level.”). 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
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Cuprimine, the patient will develop severe liver disease, and, 
eventually, dementia.15  Physical symptoms include arm tremors, 
fits, difficulty speaking, slow movements, and difficulty 
swallowing.16  Prior to Valeant’s takeover, patients paid $888 for 
Cuprimine per year in order to live normal lives.17  Now, those 
same patients must pay $26,189 each year.18  While Medicare will 
cover up to $35,000 per year of the cost,19 patients may now have 
to pay $1,800 each month, out-of-pocket.20  In retrospect, it 
appears Valeant’s price point for Cuprimine was specifically 
picked to hide under Medicare’s yearly cap on costs of a 
prescription drug to a patient.21 
In August 2015, Turing, a startup company designed to seek 
out underpriced drugs,22 paid $55 million to purchase the rights 
to Daraprim.23  Daraprim is the only approved treatment for 
toxoplasmosis, a rare parasitic infection that strikes pregnant 
women, cancer patients, and AIDS patients.24  Soon after the 
purchase of Daraprim patents, former hedge fund manager and 
Turing’s CEO, Martin Shkreli, raise Daraprim’s price from $13.50 
to $750 per pill.25  As a reward for the company’s ability to seek 
out underpriced drugs, Turing’s stock initially rose.26  While to 
 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Colin Tidy, Wilson’s Disease, PATIENT (Nov. 11, 2014), 
http://patient.info/health/wilsons-disease-leaflet. 
 17.  Id. See also Andrew Pollack & Sabrina Tavernise, Valeant’s Drug Price 
Strategy Enriches It, But Infuriates Patients and Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/05/business/valeants-drug-price-strategy-
enriches-it-but-infuriates-patients-and-lawmakers.html?_r=1. 
 18.  Pollack & Tavernise, supra note 1. 
 19.  John Russell, Turing won’t cut list price of lifesaving drug Daraprim sold at 
Walgreens, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Nov. 25, 2015), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-daraprim-price-walgreens-1126-biz-
20151125-story.html. 
 20.  Pollack & Tavernise, supra note 1. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  TURING PHARMACEUTICALS, http://www.turingpharma.com/about/company/ 
(last visited Aug. 18, 2016). 
 23.  Press Release, Impax Investors, Impax Announces Sale of Daraprim® to 
Turing Pharmaceuticals AG (Aug. 10, 2015), available at 
http://investors.impaxlabs.com/Media-Center/Press-Releases/Press-Release-
Details/2015/Impax-Announces-Sale-of-Daraprim-to-Turing-Pharmaceuticals-
AG/default.aspx. 
 24.  Linda A. Johnson, Fury Over Drug Price Spikes Rising, but Increases Aren’t 
New, ALTERNATIVE PRESS (Sept. 23, 2015), 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/00e14eb3d4804393b4281f1dd2e0c3d5/fury-over-drug-
price-spikes-rising-increases-arent-new. 
 25.  Id.  
 26.  Paul R. La Monica, Drug stock soars 400% after Martin Shkreli buys it, CNN 
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some, free market means that a company has the right to set 
prices according to whatever the market can bear,27  a majority 
the public expressed outrage at the stock price, and demanded 
that Turing moderate its price.28  As of the date of this Essay, 
however, Turing has refused to do so; instead, it has bragged that 
it was “selling up market” (e.g., to wealthy people who can afford 
the drug).29 
One can easily imagine the emotional distress that may be 
caused to patients when the learn of the increase in prices for 
their life-saving drugs.  For some patients, foregoing treatment is 
the only viable response to such increases.  Other patients will 
encounter difficulty with respect to finding adequate funding to 
fill the “donut hole” in the drug coverage.30  The conduct of 
companies such as Turing presents the U.S. with a clash between 
two fundamental values: the market, not the government, sets 
prices of goods, and the belief borne out through its history that 
compassion and moral integrity are required on behalf of 
businesses in order for the market to function.31  Without some 
 
MONEY (Nov. 19, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/11/19/investing/martin-shkreli-
turing-kalobios-drug/. 
 27.  Jonathon D. Rockoff, Lawmakers Seek Answers on Valeant’s Price Incrases, 
WSJ (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/congressional-democrats-seek-
subpoena-of-valeant-over-drug-prices-1443468385 (reporting that company 
spokesman defended pricing by indicating it was selling mostly to “upscale” market). 
And, without anything stopping him, Shkreli is continuing to use his strategy to use 
government funding designed for the poor, in order to make millions for himself. See 
Andrew Pollack, Martin Shkreli’s Latest Plan to Sharply Raise Drug Price Prompts 
Outcry, N.Y. Times (Dec. 11, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/12/business/martin-shkrelis-latest-plan-to-sharply-
raise-drug-price-prompts-outcry.html. 
 28.  See id. 
 29.  See Russell, supra note 19. 
 30.  Others will hardly notice the increase because it may be covered by Medicare 
or by private insurance policies, or because the deductible has been paid for by the 
patients. In these cases, any outrage expressed is by the community, rather than by 
the individual. As we will see, absent such individual “severe emotional distress,” the 
tort law will have difficult deterring the behavior as a tort. 
 31.  Kenneth Abraham, Liability for Bad Faith and the Principle Without a Name 
(Yet), 19 CONN. INS. L. J. 1, 12 (2013). In his article, Professor Abraham outlines the 
following conflicting values associated with the development of an obligation to 
moderate insurance behavior in dealing with insureds: 
Hidden Beliefs in the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing: 
1. Market power can be used unfairly; 
2. Power corrupts; 
3. Unchecked and unrestrained self-interest leads to 
justifications of harm; 
4. Market depends on virtuous actors to moderate power and 
greed; 
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form of creative thinking by common law judges, or legislation 
that makes such exorbitant pricing illegal—and that provides a 
civil enforcement remedy—no legal regime can act to deter 
exorbitant drug pricing of life-saving drugs.32  Unless, that is, 
courts recognize there is one already hidden in the law of torts 
(particularly in torts concerning intentional infliction of emotional 
distress (IIED) and negligent infliction of emotional distress 
(NIED)), no present legal entity has acted to deter such actions. 
Takeovers designed to take advantage of “underpriced” drugs 
presents an excellent case study for how the U.S. might develop 
policies for dealing with excesses in the marketplace.  Is it best to 
“sue the bastard,” and use the courts to investigate these matters 
on a case-by-case basis (or is it better to investigate a claim as a 
class action)?  Would it be best for Congress to investigate the 
situation, and then promulgate regulations designed to remedy 
the matter?  Or, is some combination of the two approaches 
feasible?33 
This Essay argues that a cause of action for IIED or for NIED 
should play a significant role in moderating exorbitant pricing of 
lifesaving drugs.  Additionally, for real change to occur in the 
market, lawyers should use class action rules on behalf of all 
patients who are prescribed the particular drug.  Most 
importantly, such cases should seek an injunction, to enjoin the 
price increase for all patients taking the drug, in order to force a 
collective bargaining by the patients to bring the cost to a 
reasonable level.34  The advantage to using tort law, in 
 
5. Market depends on virtuous actors to moderate power and 
greed; 
6. The example of insurance and “bad faith.” 
Professor Abraham concludes: 
The character of the principle I discern in insurance law is one of 
obligation resting on the nature and contemporary importance of 
insurance, not resting on the consent and trust that are part of 
governance.  Few individuals trust their insurers or consent to 
anything meaningful in connection with their purchase of 
insurance. . . . [T]he principle is lurking in our law, and recognition 
of the principle’s existence will enhance our understanding of what 
insurance law is, and what insurance does.  
Id. at 11-12. 
 32.  See id. 
 33.  JEB BARNES & THOMAS F. BURKE, HOW POLICY SHAPES POLITICS: RIGHTS, 
COURTS, LITIGATION, AND THE STRUGGLE OVER INJURY COMPENSATION (Oxford 
University Press ed., 2015) 
 34.  In determining the best method of structuring a proposed class action 
settlement, one of the first areas of inquiry may concern the rule under which the 
settlement class will be certified. The most common options available consist of 
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combination with certifying a class for settlement purposes, is 
that such a combination would provide a forum for collective 
bargaining between those who take the drug and the drug’s 
manufacturer—a forum that is currently prohibited by private 
insurance companies under antitrust law35 and Medicare insurers 
under healthcare law.36  Litigation might be the best method to 
bring about the collective bargaining forces that are needed to 
ensure fair market pricing for life-saving drugs by providing for 
direct bargaining between patients and the pharmaceutical 
companies. 
This Essay further employs the work of Jeb Barnes and 
Thomas Burke to assist in understanding the advantages of using 
an adversarial litigation approach to the problem of exorbitant 
 
certification under Sections 23(b) and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
or their equivalents under state rules of civil procedure. Rule 23(b)(2) authorizes 
certification when “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds 
that apply generally to the class, so that the final injunctive relief or corresponding 
declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(b)(2). Certification under this Section is conditioned upon a determination that “the 
court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate 
over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is 
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 
controversy.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). For settlement purposes, the primary advantage 
of Rule 23(b)(2) is the mandatory nature of the class, which precludes class members 
from opting out of the settlement. However, certification under this Rule is only 
appropriate if the requested declaratory or injunctive relief predominates. Therefore, 
most courts will limit monetary damages under such a class to those that are 
“incidental” to the injunctive relief, such that the damages “flow directly from liability 
to the class as a whole on the claims forming the basis of the injunctive or declaratory 
relief,” and are not dependent upon factors unique to each individual claim. Allison v. 
Citgo Petroleum Co., 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998). These limitations on monetary 
damages often lead settling parties to favor certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) settlement 
class, notwithstanding the potential for opt-outs. 
 35.  The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides, in relevant part: “[T]he Sherman 
Act . . . shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business 
is not regulated by State Law.” 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1976). However, [t]o the extent a 
state regulates such business by state law, the Sherman Act and other federal 
antitrust laws are not applicable.” Crawford v. American Title Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 217, 
218 (5th Cir. 1975). 
 36.  Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, 
Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066. “In 2003, Congress and President Bush enacted 
the “Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act,” which 
established a prescription drug program for Medicare. The legislation expressly 
prohibited Medicare from negotiating drug prices with pharmaceutical companies. 
Rather, any negotiation that takes place is to be between pharmaceutical companies 
and the insurance companies that administer the Medicare prescription drug 
program.” David Hogberg, Letting Medicare ‘Negotiate’ Drug Prices: Myths vs. Reality, 
NAT’L CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH (January 2007), 
https://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA550MedicareDrugPrices.html. 
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drug prices over legislative or bureaucratic remedies.37  Their 
analysis will aid in understanding why, if the courts recognize a 
tort and certify a class of patients, the courts should fashion a 
remedy not solely for Medicare patients,38 but should also use 
their equitable powers to oversee a lowering of prices for all 
patients.39  In additional, the analysis will assist in showing that 
IIED or NIED may be the first step in providing a final remedy 
for exorbitant pricing of a drug.40  Some may argue that courts are 
notoriously ill-suited for the task of dealing with mass numbers of 
claims involving patients with different financial, medical, and 
insurance-related circumstances.41  However, in such cases, the 
courts can most quickly and efficiently respond to individual cases 
and provide remedies to groups of affected patients, while giving 
legislatures time to sort out a price refereeing system that will 
best balance market principles with compassion for the patients. 
As a corollary to the Barnes and Burke analysis, this Essay 
will show that, at the federal level, Medicare regulation 
amendments to prohibit predatory pricing might not be the best 
approach.42  While a Medicare approach may assist in guarding 
against some predatory pricing, it will most likely contribute to 
 
 37.  BARNES & BURKE, supra note 33, at 6-11. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. On the other hand, the state legislations seem caught in a race to the 
bottom when it comes to business regulations. The problem is that high prices for goods 
in high demand are a key feature of a free market, supported by basic beliefs that such 
pricing leads to efficient development of breakthrough pharmaceuticals.  
 41.  GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? (Univ. of Chicago Press ed., 1991). See also David Partlett, Asbestos Wars: 
In Three Parts, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 759, 763-64 (2014). On the other hand, there 
is little evidence of the drawbacks to litigation that these critiques raise. BARNES & 
BURKE, supra note 33, at 17. And, there are significant drawbacks, for patients, to 
waiting for a legislative remedy for high-priced pharmaceuticals. First, there is the 
impact of the Presidential campaign, and, second, there is the impact of Citizen’s 
United, and the ability of money to capture the legislature and to delay remedies to 
patients in the throes of losing life savings, fighting disease, and suffering emotional 
distress. 
 42.  Medicare Advantage (MA) and Prescription Drug (PD) plans are permitted to 
participate in the Medicare Program pursuant to Sections 1857 and 1860D-12 of the 
Social Security Act, and under regulations at 42 C.F.R., Section 422.500. If the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) denies an application to qualify as a MA or 
PD plan, or takes adverse action (e.g., termination, non-renewal, intermediate 
sanction) against an existing MA or PD plan, the applicant or existing plan is entitled 
to request a hearing before a CMS Hearing Officer. 42 C.F.R.  422.660, 423.650 (2010). 
Additionally, the CMS Hearing Officer’s decision may be reviewed by the CMS 
Administrator. 42 C.F. R. §§ 423.666, 422.690 (2010). 
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even higher prices for patients with private insurance plans.43  
Antitrust prohibitions against insurance companies combining to 
negotiate lower prices are at the center of this problem.  In other 
words, Medicare legislation will not keep separate patient groups 
from pursuing multiple and divisive strategies that may pit one 
drug user against another. 
Instead, what is necessary—but not yet politically palpable—
is legislation similar to that used by Europe and Canada.44  The 
U.S. needs a “price referencing system,” either used by the 
government in a single payer system, or by an agency to address 
the prices private insurers will pay for drugs.  In the agency 
context, the agency should use a price-referencing model, and 
reimburse for life-saving drugs only in an amount that is 
determined either by an “internal” price referencing system or in 
reference to “external markets” of similar drug pricing for the 
drugs.  However, such solutions are not in our near future, and 
the next best solution will be one developed through tort law.  In 
fact by educating the drug manufacturers and public of the harm 
from exorbitantly priced life-saving drugs, can be an essential 
force to drive the eventual enactment of price referencing 
legislation for all drugs.45 
Part II of this Essay examines the evolution of IIED, in order 
to determine whether the actions of Turing and Valeant fit within 
the prima facie elements of this tort.  Next, Part III looks to NIED, 
and examines whether this tort will provide a method of relief 
against exorbitant pricing of life-saving drugs.46  The NIED 
 
 43.  Hogberg, supra note 36. 
 44.  Rugerri & Nolte, supra note 8. 
 45.  As such, these cases present good case studies for considering the basic 
assumptions behind free market principles, as well as the countervailing and virtue-
based assumptions submerged in these torts, and the covenants of good faith and fair 
dealing. Which of these hidden beliefs is stronger, or, which will be the winner in the 
U.S. pricing of drugs? Perhaps there is a way for common law torts to help rebalance 
the market equation. 
 46.  What follows, then, will be what may look to some as a rather conventional 
and outdated recapitulation of the case law that gave birth to the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Yet, as Robert Sokolowski has said in The 
Science of Being as Being in Aristotle, Aquinasm, and Wipple: 
Such rethinking, moreover, is not just a matter of reconfiguring 
signs and symbols in a hermetically closed system; it is a response 
to the way things are, but it is a response we make with the help of 
others, those we recapitulate and those with whom we converse. 
These other people will help us to see things and to understand what 
they are; we do not just repeat what other people have said and we 
do not just live in meanings and in opinions. 
Robert, Sokolowski, The Science of Being as Being in Aristotle, Aquinasm, and Wipple, 
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analysis also addresses the essential obligation imbedded in the 
common law that everyone, including those who act in the 
marketplace, must conduct themselves in a manner that will not 
cause undue emotional harm.  Part II concludes that there are 
likely to be significant, but not insurmountable, hurdles to the 
recognition of causes of action in common law torts. 
Part IV begins by questioning whether class certification can 
provide the means for patients to negotiate a lower price for their 
drugs.  The Part next addresses whether tort cases, combined 
with class action certifications that seek injunctions, will likely 
bring about a significant moderation of high prices for life-saving 
drugs.  Again, current law presents obstacles for patients seeking 
remedies for high-priced drugs; but those obstacles are not 
hopeless.  Part IV uses the Barnes and Burke framework to 
provide support for the use of class action certification and 
equitable relief as important features of the litigation approach.  
This framework will also be used to examine whether it would be 
better to wait for legislation like that developed in other areas of 
personal injury compensation.47  Part IV further considers 
whether legislation that empowers Medicare to negotiate lower 
prices is likely to lower such prices without creating unintended 
pricing effects on the drug market as a whole. 
Finally, Part V describes and employs a case study designed 
to provide compensation for victims of outrageous business 
practices.  Using the history of bad faith insurance laws and 
breach of covenants of good faith and fair dealing, this Part will 
exhibit the advantages of a state-driven, integrated approach to 
developing laws designed to remedy market improprieties.  Part 
V concludes that legislation patterned on bad faith insurance 
legislation could help overcome the common law limitations to 
tort class actions that might be raised by overly cautious courts. 
Limiting exorbitant drug pricing can occur faster, fairer, and 
more efficiently when courts are involved.  Court decisions using 
long-established doctrines of common law torts better remedy the 
problem of exorbitant pricing of life-saving drugs.  Additionally, 
such court decisions avoid the problems inherent in waiting for 
legislation.  Finally, where courts utilize their equity powers, life-
 
in 55 THE SCIENCE OF BEING AS BEING: METAPHYSICAL INVESTIGATIONS 9, 10 (Gregory 
T. Doolan ed., 2012). This is the spirit with which I wish to explore the common law 
development of IIED. 
 47.  BARNES & BURKE, supra note 33 (describing different approaches taken to 
Social Security Disability Insurance, Asbestos Injury Compensation, and Vaccine 
Injury Compensation). Barnes and Burke conclude that there are advantages to using 
adversarial litigation to shape policy for injury compensation. Id. 
ZWIER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2016  9:42 AM 
214    BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 17.2 
saving drug pricing can occur without problems that result from 
bureaucratic solutions.  Therefore, while it may ultimately be 
preferable to implement legislation of a federally moderated price-
referencing system, the better and more realistic approach in the 
U.S. is for courts to take the lead in efforts to combat the harmful 
effects of corporate greed. 
II.  INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
Since the mid-1940s, IIED has served as a limitation on 
behavior at the extremes of marketplace activity.48  The key 
elements of IIED require (1) proof of “extreme and outrageous 
conduct” (2) that causes “severe emotional distress.”49 
A.  EVEN AS IIED EMERGED IT WAS USED TO DISCIPLINE 
MARKET EXCESSES 
Nickerson v. Hodges50 is one of the first cases to validate a 
claim of IIED, specifically with respect to behavior directed at an 
individual with an impairment.  In Nickerson, Miss Nickerson, 
who had been a patient in a mental asylum, was told by a fortune 
teller that Miss Nickerson’s relatives had buried gold on a 
particular man’s land.51  After the man welcomed Miss Nickerson 
onto his property, she began to search for the gold.52  Shortly 
thereafter, the man’s daughter and two of her acquaintances filled 
a container with rocks and dirt and buried it on the premises with 
the intention that Miss Nickerson would discover this “pot of 
gold.”53  They also placed a note in the container, which stated 
that it should not be opened for three days and to notify all heirs 
of its existence.54  Miss Nickerson discovered the container that 
had been placed into the property, took it to the bank, and notified 
all heirs as the note instructed.55  Once all had gathered for the 
 
 48.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965); William L. Prosser, Intentional 
Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874, 877 (1939); Daniel 
Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 
42, 42 (1982). 
 49.  See id. 
 50.  84 So. 37(La. 1920). 
 51.  Id. at 37. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. at 38. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
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opening of the container, it was opened and its contents 
revealed.56  Immediately upon discovering that the container did 
not contain gold, Miss Nickerson flew into a rage and threw 
herself at one of the pranksters until she could be restrained.57 
While the Nickerson court recognized that the entire incident 
was a practical joke and that there was no serious, malicious 
intent, it also recognized that the defendants knew Miss 
Nickerson had at one time been a patient in a mental institution, 
and the joke had severely humiliated her.58  The court ultimately 
awarded Miss Nickerson’s estate damages for the emotional 
distress that she had experienced.59 
Nickerson provides us with a number of important insights.  
First, the court found that a valid claim existed, despite the fact 
that the defendants did not force Miss Nickerson to incur the costs 
related to the time and expense to dig for the treasure.  Further, 
in addition to the costs incurred by the plaintiff, the court 
awarded damages for the distress caused by the defendant, even 
though the extreme nature of distress may have been caused by 
the existing mental conditions of the plaintiff.60  The court’s 
decision implicitly embraced a recognition of the common 
vulnerability of persons with medical conditions. 
One subset of IIED claims particularly analogous to the drug 
pricing examples, are those involving bill collection companies 
that attempt to induce debtors to pay their debts.  For example, 
in Public Finance Corp. v. Davis,61 the debtor sued for severe 
emotional distress after a creditor, having been informed that the 
debtor was in the hospital tending to her very ill daughter, called 
the debtor at the hospital.62  In a well-reasoned dissent, Judge 
Dooley detailed the extensive case law that supported a cause of 
action for IIED where bill collectors used dunning tactics to coerce 
payments.63  Judge Dooley, while admitting that the bill collector 
had every right in the market to demand payment, declared that 
its repeated and harassing phone calls and dunning letters 
threatening the debtor with a prison sentence constituted 
intentional conduct that warranted the label of “extreme and 
 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. at 39. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  360 N.E.2d 765 (Ill. 1976). 
 62.  Id. at 768. 
 63.  Id. at 770-71 (Dooley, J. dissenting). 
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outrageous.”64 
Many early IIED cases involved insurance companies that 
recklessly denied coverage under their policies.65  Again, the 
outrageousness of the conduct is in direct proportion to the 
common vulnerability created by an insurance company that 
wrongfully denies coverage in cases of fire, liability, or poor 
health, and where the plaintiff may be forced to forgo basic needs 
and services because of the company’s behavior.  Therefore, where 
defendant insurance company tries to avoid paying on a policy, 
IIED is often paired with a cause of action for a breach of covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing.66  For example, in Fletcher v. 
Western Nat’l Life Ins. Co.,67 the defendants, an insurance 
company and its claim adjuster, sent “false and threatening 
letters” and “employ[ed] economic pressure” on the plaintiff in an 
attempt to force the plaintiff to “surrender” his insurance policy.68  
Although the defendants conceded that the conducted was 
outrageous, they argued that the plaintiff’s emotional distress did 
not rise to a sufficient level of severity to establish a valid claim 
of IIED.69  The court disagreed, however, holding that the 
resulting distress incurred by the plaintiff was sufficient to give 
rise to a claim for IIED against the defendants.70 
IIED exists even where the parties have entered into a 
voluntary association with one another.  Take for instance, the 
 
 64.  Id. at 773. 
 65.  The story of insurance bad faith claims in California begins with its Supreme 
Court’s decision in Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198 (1958) (in 
banc). In Comunale, the plaintiffs were injured by the defendant’s insured in an 
automobile accident. Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 200 (1958) 
(in banc). The insurance policy had limits of liability in the sum of $10,000 for each 
person injured and $20,000 for each accident. Id. The insurance company refused to 
defend the action, arguing that the truck driven by the insured did not belong to him. 
Id. The insured retained counsel to represent him. Id. On the second day of trial, the 
plaintiffs indicated that they would settle the case for $4,000, and the insured 
communicated this offer to the defendant, explaining that he did not have enough 
money to effect the settlement. Id. The insurance company refused to settle, and the 
trial proceeded to judgment in favor of the plaintiffs for a total of $26,250. Id. For an 
excellent history of the development of the law of bad faith in California, see J. Clark 
Kelso & Kari C. Kelso, Jury Verdicts in Insurance Bad Faith Cases, INSTITUTE FOR 
LEGISLATIVE PRACTICE (1999).  
 66.  See Fletcher v. Western Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 403 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1970). 
 67.  10 Cal. App. 3d 376 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970). 
 68.  Id. at 392. 
 69.  Id. at 394. 
 70.  Id. 
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case of George v. Jordan Marsh Co.71 There, a company and its 
employee were alleged to have badgered and harassed a woman 
by “dunning tactics” in an attempt to intimidate the plaintiff into 
paying her son’s debt to the company.72  The complaint further 
alleged that such acts caused the plaintiff “great mental anguish 
and emotional distress as intended by the defendant(s)” and that, 
as a result thereof, the plaintiff’s health deteriorated and she 
suffered a heart attack.73  Further, notwithstanding the woman’s 
attorney’s request that the “harassing tactics be discontinued,” 
the company persisted in its harassment, which caused the 
woman to suffer even greater emotional distress that  resulted in 
a second heart attack.74  The court held that all such acts by the 
company prevented the woman from enjoying gainful employment 
and caused her to incur expenses for medicine, medical 
attendance, and nursing.75 
Perhaps most analogous to situations of exorbitant drug 
pricing is the early IIED case of Rockhill v. Pollard.76  In Rockhill, 
woman and her ten-month-old baby were injured in an automobile 
accident.77  The baby appeared lifeless at the scene of the accident 
and was rushed to a nearby hospital where the woman had to ask 
a doctor several times to examine the baby.78  Although the doctor 
finally agreed to examine the baby, all that he did was perform a 
simple examination and tell the woman that there was nothing 
wrong with her child.79  The woman took her baby to an entirely 
different hospital where the baby was treated for shock and a 
head injury.80  The doctor’s rude remarks, disdain, and disregard 
for the feelings of the woman and her baby in Rockhill were 
legendary.81  Important to the discussion in this Essay was the 
doctor’s seeming indifference to the life-threatening situation 
confronting the woman and her child.  Despite the fact that the 
 
 71.  268 N.E.2d 915 (Mass. 1971). 
 72.  Id. at 916 (internal quotation omitted). 
 73.  Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  485 P.2d 28 (Or. 1971). 
 77.  Id. at 29. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. at 29-30. 
 80.  Id. at 30. 
 81.  The doctor was impatient, hardly examined the child, and shrugged his 
shoulders when questioned by the baby’s mother. He also made the woman wait with 
her baby outside in below-freezing temperatures for someone to pick her up. See id. at 
29-30. 
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child fully recovered,82 the Rockhill court found that the 
emotional distress inflicted upon the woman was severe enough 
to warrant a new trial.83  In so holding, the court stated: 
[The woman] must show not only that [the doctor’s] 
conduct was outrageous, but also that she in fact 
suffered emotional distress as a result, and that it was 
severe.  There is not much evidence on this point, but 
it is direct and the court must take it as true.  [The 
woman], corroborated by her husband, testified that 
as a result of [the doctor’s] behavior she became 
nervous and had to take tranquilizers, and that her 
nervousness caused sleeplessness and loss of appetite 
over a considerable period of time up to the date of the 
trial.  [The doctor] belittles these symptoms, but it is 
the distress which must be severe, not the physical 
manifestations.  Mental distress would have to be 
more than mild and transitory in order to cause these 
symptoms over a two-year period.84 
Also among the early IIED cases is DiCicco v. Trinidad Area 
Health Association,85 which involved a hospital administrator 
who refused to provide emergency services to a patient.  The 
administrator, whose hospital provided the only ambulance in the 
county, had refused to dispatch the ambulance unless the 
patient’s doctor consented to having the patient sent to the 
administrator’s hospital—not the hospital the doctor had deemed 
best suited to treat the patient’s condition.86  Due to the 
administrator’s refusal to send an ambulance, the doctor was 
forced to request an ambulance from a location more than twenty 
miles away, which resulted in substantial delay in transporting 
the patient the hospital (where she died within one hour of 
arrival).87  The patient’s husband thereafter sued the hospital 
administrator and the operator of the ambulance service for 
outrageous conduct arising from the patient’s death.88  The court 
held that the defendants’ “refusal of ambulance service to the 
critically ill [patient] on grounds irrelevant to her need for, or the 
availability of the service. . . . “ could constitute extreme and 
 
 82.  Id. at 31. 
 83.  Id. at 33. 
 84.  Id. at 32-33 (internal citations omitted). 
 85.  573 P.2d 559 (Colo. App. 1977). 
 86.  Id. at 560-61. 
 87.  Id. at 561. 
 88.  Id. at 560. 
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outrageous conduct.89  Finding the existence of a tort also fit 
within the overall policies of intentional torts that, to deny 
recovery creates the risk of a breach of peace and the risk of 
violence—for without a remedy, plaintiffs will be tempted to take 
the law into their own hands.90 
B.  DOES THE CONDUCT OF TURING AND VALEANT MEET 
THE “EXTREME AND OUTRAGEOUS” STANDARD? 
The parallels between the early IIED cases, discussed supra, 
and the corporate conduct of Turing and Valeant are striking.  
Prescription drugs, like the ambulance in DiCicco, are integral to 
emergency medical treatment.  The emergency nature of the 
situation in DiCicco necessitated a level of care that is reasonably 
under the circumstance, and the court was outraged that a 
market actor would take advantage of the patient strictly due to 
financial reasons.  In medical emergencies, a price demand can 
border on extortion and coercion, and belies the word “free” in free 
market.  DiCicco and the other cases provide, therefore, that 
limits do exist on the extremes of free market behavior and such 
limits are grounded in community reaction to the behavior—as 
determined by a jury.  It is not sufficient for the plaintiff to show 
his individual reaction to the defendant’s behavior; the reaction 
must also be shared by a jury.  In examining the arguments made 
by attorneys to juries, we can rediscover the reasoning behind 
common law limitations on market excesses. 
Perhaps most important—because it is a principle that 
emerges from the appellate courts affirmance of jury findings—is 
tort law’s special concern in emergency situations for the parent, 
child, elderly, and mentally ill.91  What courts emphasize is that, 
 
 89.  Id. at 562. 
 90.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS §§1-3 (AM. LAW. INST. 1998). The defenses to 
intentional torts reflect the concern that individuals are likely to engage in violence 
out of necessity, see Vincent v. Lake Erie, 124 N.W. 221, 222 (Minn. 1910); or for the 
protection of life, see Courvoisier v. Raymond, 47 P. 284, 285 (Colo. 1896); or for the 
protection of others, see id.; or defense of property, see Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 
657, 661 (Iowa 1971). 
 91.  Prosser, supra note 48, 878-881. The Restatement (Second) of Torts offers an 
illustration to explain this type of situation: 
A, an eccentric and mentally deficient old maid, has the delusion 
that a pot of gold is buried in her back yard, and is always digging 
for it.  Knowing this, B buries a pot with other contents in her yard, 
and when A digs it up causes her to be escorted in triumph to the 
city hall, where the pot is opened under circumstances of public 
humiliation to A.  A suffers severe emotional disturbance and 
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while we are not all vulnerable to the ravages of disease, some of 
us are more resilient than others.92  As a result of this distinction, 
courts may be holding that our common vulnerability presents us 
with the ability to recognize the outrageousness of conduct, and 
the lack of resilience of particular populations (e.g., the young, the 
old, the widow).  In such cases, the courts describe a “golden” 
thread.  Marketplace behavior must moderate out a concern for 
the vulnerability of all those in the throes of life-threatening 
disease and, in particular, for those less resilient individuals who 
will suffer the consequences of exorbitant pricing. 
Second, a trial lawyer might present evidence that many 
drugs may have been developed, in large part, through 
government funding.93  There is something misleading, if not 
deceitful, about the claim that high prices are necessary to cover 
the costs of development.  While increased prices may be 
necessary to develop future drugs where government funding is 
 
resulting illness.  B is subject to liability to A for both. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. f, illus. 9. This illustration is taken from 
the Nickerson case. See supra notes 48-58, and accompanying text. The facts are 
somewhat different from the Restatement’s illustration; in Nickerson there were 
multiple defendants and the digging occurred on another’s property. Nevertheless, the 
Nickerson court, many years before the Restatement’s 1948 amendment, found the 
conduct actionable: The conspirators, no doubt, merely intended what they did as a 
practical joke, and had no willful intention of injuring the lady. “However, the results 
were quite serious indeed, and the mental suffering and humiliation must have been 
quite unbearable, to say nothing of the disappointment and conviction, which she 
carried to her grave some two years later.” Nickerson v. Hodges, 84 So. 37, 39 (La. 
1920).  
In support of the view that protecting the vulnerable is an important aim of tort law, 
see John Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liability for Emotional Harm, 90 MARQ. 
L. REV. 789, 803 (2007); Jane Stapleton, The Golden Thread at the Heart of Tort Law: 
Protection of the Vulnerable, in 44 CENTENARY ESSAYS FOR THE HIGH COURT OF 
AUSTRALIA 242, 242-255 (Peter Cane ed., 2004); Carl F. Stychin, The Vulnerable 
Subject of Negligence Law, Int’l J. L. Context 337, 345 (2012). See generally Martha 
Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008); STUDIES IN 
FEMINIST THEORY, VULNERABILITY: NEW ESSAYS IN ETHICS AND FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY 
(Catriona Mackenzie, Wendy Rogers, & Susan Dodds eds., 2013). 
 92.  I am particularly grateful to my colleague, Martha Fineman, for her helpful 
suggestions derived from her Vulnerability Theory. See Martha Albertson Fineman, 
“Elderly” as Vulnerable: Rethinking the Nature of Individual and Societal 
Responsibility, 20 U. ILL. ELDER L.J. 71, 92 (2012).   
 93.  Bob Young & Michael Surrusco, RX R&D Myths: The Case Against the Drug 
Industry’s R&D “Scare Card”, PUBLIC CITIZEN (July 2001), 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACFDC.PDF. Cf. Ezekiel K. Emanuel, I Am Paying 
for Your Expensive Medicine, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/08/opinion/sunday/i-am-paying-for-your-expensive-
medicine.html?emc=eta1&_r=1 (citing the example of PCSK0 inhibitors, which lower 
the bad type of cholesterol, LDL, priced at $14,000 per year, developed by publically 
funded research). 
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not adequate, it was not necessary to the development of many of 
the drugs that were at the center of the price explosion. 
Next, a trial lawyer could argue that conduct is outrageous 
when it takes advantage of government funding designed to 
alleviate the suffering of those in need of life-saving drugs.  This 
“taking advantage” of government funding is “unjust 
enrichment.”94  Note that unjust enrichment is the equitable 
remedy provided against tobacco companies who used state 
healthcare dollars to free ride in the market with the sale of 
tobacco.95  It is nonetheless relevant to a jury determination of the 
outrageous nature of the defendant’s conduct.  Similar to tobacco 
companies, the pharmaceutical companies externalize the costs of 
their behavior onto other government programs.96  They depend 
on tax-funded programs that lack the necessary market 
protections in the case of life-saving medications,97 and price 
them, not based on costs of development or special insights into 
their development, but simply by buying up the patients and then 
hoisting the costs onto the public as a whole.98  The companies are 
enriched through their public use of funds, but it is to the 
detriment of both the patient and the public at large.99  Moreover, 
unjust enrichment will not only be important for understanding 
the outrageousness of the behavior, it will also be particularly 
important to understanding what remedies the court should 
approve once a class action lawsuit has been authorized. 
Finally, the common vulnerability of every member of the 
community in life-threatening situations to the exorbitant pricing 
schemes is what distinguishes the conduct as particularly 
outrageous.  It is not just certain populations, or those who do not 
 
 94.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (AM. 
LAW INST. 2011) (“A person who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another is 
subject to liability in restitution.”). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT Foreword (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
 95.  But see Doug Rendleman, Common Law Restitution in the Mississippi 
Tobacco Settlement: Did the Smoke Get in Their Eyes?, 33 Ga. L. Rev. 847, 848 (1999) 
(Professor Rendleman has criticized the application of restitution to the tobacco 
litigation). I am grateful for this insight from Professor Candace Kovacic-Fleischer, 
who reviewed a copy of this article in connection with the Louisville Remedies Forum. 
Professor Kovacic-Fleischer’s analysis of unjust enrichment, in connection with 
Walmart’s use of wage and price strategies to keep their workers on food stamps is 
simply brilliant. 
 96.  Rockoff, supra note 27. 
 97.  See id. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Robert Kneller, The importance of new companies for drug discovery: origins 
of a decade of new drugs, 9 NATURE REVIEWS: DRUG DISCOVERY 867, 873 (Nov. 2010). 
ZWIER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2016  9:42 AM 
222    BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 17.2 
take care of themselves, or even a select minority population that 
is at risk to these high prices.  We will all face death, but we 
potentially have our lives extended and their quality enhanced 
through access to life-saving drugs.  Whether for Cancer,100 high 
blood pressure, heart attack, or Wilson’s disease, drugs will be 
vital both to survival and to our quality of life.  Our common 
vulnerability is what helps expose the outrageous nature of the 
pricing act, which has the potential to rob us all of our life’s 
savings in times where we have little choice but to spend the 
money.  It could happen to any one of us—we are all vulnerable to 
the practice.101 
1.  Intent Element 
The intent element of IIED is met even without the existence 
of a specific intent to cause harm to a particular person.102  Early 
 
 100.  Andrew Pollock, Doctors Denounce Cancer Drug Prices of $100,000 a Year, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/26/business/cancer-
physicians-attack-high-drug-costs.html?_r=0. 
 101.  Let’s take a closer look at the concept of vulnerability and then determine if 
it can help support a cause of action for IIED. Martha Fineman describes the 
vulnerability thesis and its fundamental assertion as follows: 
Often narrowly understood as merely “openness to physical or 
emotional harm,” vulnerability should be recognized as the primal 
human condition.  As embodied beings, we are universally and 
individually constantly susceptible to harm, whether caused by 
infancy and lack of capacity, disease and physical decline, or by 
natural or manufactured disasters.  This form of dependency, 
although episodic, is universally experienced and could be thought 
of as the physical manifestation or realization of our shared 
vulnerability as human persons, which is constant throughout the 
life course.  This realized form of human vulnerability has a social 
or relational component, as well as physical implications, because 
we are innately dependent on the provision of care by others when 
we are infants and often when we are ill, aged, or disabled.  In this 
way, human vulnerability should be understood as providing the 
compelling impetus for the creation of social relationships and 
institutions, necessitating the formation of families, communities, 
associations, and even political entities and nation-states.  The 
social roles defined by and through these relationships and 
institutions are not universally experienced, nor are their functions 
inevitable or inherent in the human condition.  Rather, they are 
socially constructed and contingent in nature; built and maintained 
within institutions such as the family, the school, and the 
workplace. 
Martha Albertson Fineman, Equality and Difference – The Restrained State, 66 ALA. 
L. REV. 609, 614 (2015) (internal citations omitted). I would also add “the hospital” to 
Professor Fineman’s list of institutions. 
 102.  Joseph H. King, The Torts Restatement’s Inchoate Definition of Intent for 
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common law cases in intentional torts established these 
principles, including the case of Vosburg v. Putney.103  In Vosburg, 
the intent element was established for a battery claim despite the 
dual intent nature of the defendant’s action, when the defendant 
kicked the plaintiff to get the plaintiff’s attention—not to harm 
the plaintiff.104  Additionally, in Garrett v. Dailey,105 intent was 
again established even though the defendant’s action was meant 
as a joke—moving the plaintiff’s chair as the plaintiff was sitting 
down when the defendant knew “with substantial certainty” that 
the plaintiff would hit the ground.106  Intent, therefore, can be 
defined as general knowledge of unlawful contact, apprehension 
of contact, imprisonment to a bounded area, or trespass to land, 
despite a secondary lawful intent.107  Mistake is no defense.108 
Moreover, the Restatement’s definition of IIED loosens the 
intent requirement: 
One who by extreme and outrageous conduct 
intentionally or recklessly causes severer emotional 
 
Battery, and Reflections on the Province of Restatements, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 623, 624 
(2011). 
 103.  50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891). 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  304 P.2d 681 (Wash. 1956). 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Joseph H. King, The Torts Restatement’s Inchoate Definition of Intent for 
Battery, and Reflections on the Province of Restatements, 38 Pepp. L. Rev. 623, 624 
(2011). King writes: 
The new Restatement (Third) defines intent in its first section, 
stating that “[a] person acts with the intent to produce a 
consequence if . . . the person acts with the purpose of producing 
that consequence; or . . . acts knowing that the consequence is 
substantially certain to result.”  This definition is an umbrella one, 
providing an all-inclusive definition of what it means to “intend” 
something.  It simply defines the state of mind needed to support a 
finding that a defendant intended “something” as a “consequence.”  
But, before a person may be determined to have entertained the 
necessary intent for a specific tort, we have to also know what 
“consequence” must have been intended for that tort.  The Section 1 
definition does not address that aspect of intent—the nature of the 
“consequence” that must have been intended to support various 
traditional torts that require intent, such as battery.  Rather, for 
the present, it expressly defers to the Restatement (Second) sections 
that address the substantive details and elements of those torts.  
The comments state that the “Restatement (Second), Torts, remains 
largely authoritative in explaining the details of the specific torts 
encompassed by this Section and in specifying the elements and 
limits of the various affirmative defenses that might be available.” 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 108.  Id. 
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distress to another is subject to liability for such 
emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other 
results from it, for such bodily harm.109 
The comments to the Restatement elaborate on this point: 
The rule stated in this section applies where the actor 
desires to inflict severe emotional distress, and also 
where he knows that such distress is certain or 
substantially certain, to result from his conduct.  It 
applies also where he acts recklessly . . . in complete 
disregard of a high degree of probability that the 
emotional distress will follow.110 
In other words, hospitals and pharmaceutical companies 
should be treated just as those employers who, without sufficient 
policies to prevent race discrimination and sexual harassment, 
are found liable for IIED, despite their lack of specific intent to 
cause a plaintiff emotional distress.111  Where corporate 
executives describe market strategies that show intent to take 
advantage of the patients’ need for the drugs in order to coerce 
exorbitant prices, they have shown the necessary intent and the 
knowledge, with “substantial certainty,” needed to fulfill the 
intent element.112 
2.  Severe Emotional Distress 
While the “outrage” element of IIED is met in these cases, the 
“severe emotional distress” element may be more difficult for a 
plaintiff to establish.  Commentators have noted that the more 
egregious the conduct by the institution, the less it is required to 
 
 109.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (AM. LAW. INST. 1965) (emphasis 
added). 
 110.  Id. cmt. i. 
 111.  Dennis P. Duffy, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Employment 
At Will: The Case Against ‘Tortification’ of Labor and Employment Law, 74 B.U. L. 
REV. 387, 392 (1994). Tort doctrine has difficulty with imposing vicarious liability for 
intentional torts. Yet there are examples of vicarious liability for employees’ bad faith 
decisions on behalf of insurance companies: sexual harassment and quid pro quo sex 
by managers, beatings by bouncers, and hazing by sports players, to name a few. The 
key ingredient in imposing liability is notice to the institution of the employee’s 
behavior—something evidenced by the pharmaceutical company’s board in its pricing 
and profit projection reports. 
 112.  Andrew Pollack, Martin Shkreli’s Arrest Gives Drug Makers Cover, N.Y. 
Times (Dec. 18, 2015). Pollack  reports a twitter post from Skreli where he admits to 
knowing that some people may not be able to afford the drug: “If you can afford our 
drugs with insurance, great. . . . If you can’t you can have it for free.  Our system 
works.”  Id. (quoting @MartinShkreli, TWITTER (Dec. 16, 2015, 10:24 AM), 
https://twitter.com/MartinShkreli/status/677192472490065920). 
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establish physical manifestations of the harm.113  Even then, 
subsequent decisions show just how difficult it is for plaintiffs to 
prove this element.  For example, in Figueiredo-Torres v. 
Nickel,114 the court denied a motion to dismiss but noted that the 
plaintiff would face significant obstacles in establishing the 
severity of the emotional distress and whether it had been 
proximately caused by the defendant’s conduct.115  To further 
illustrate, in Figueiredo-Torres, a marriage counselor told the 
plaintiff to take some time away from his wife, all while engaging 
in his own sexual relationship with the wife.116  The plaintiff’s wife 
subsequently left him, and he sued the marriage counselor, 
claiming the events had caused him to seek counseling and 
affected his ability to enter into future intimate relationships.117  
The court held that, to sort out the cause of the plaintiff’s distress 
(whether from the end of his marriage or the behavior of the 
counselor) would be the plaintiff’s burden to prove.118 
In Caldor, Inc. v. Bowden,119 a young black man was falsely 
accused of theft by his white employers, and wrongfully detained 
in a dark room of the business for hours until he agreed to confess 
to stealing money.120  Just as with the aforementioned cases, the 
Bowden court found it difficult to accept the young man’s proof of 
“severe emotional distress.”121  Despite the fact that the young 
man testified to being worried and distraught, as well as 
ashamed, the court agreed with the lower court’s decision that the 
emotional distress suffered by the young man did not “meet the 
standards” of the tort of IIED.122 
Since Bowden, there have been few cases in the U.S. finding 
IIED, alone, as a basis for liability.123  However, IIED has had 
potency as a ride along, or parasitic, tort in the areas of labor and 
 
 113.  DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 826-27 (WEST GROUP ed., 2000). 
 114.  584 A.2d 69 (Md. 1991). 
 115.  Id. at 77. 
 116.  Id. at 71. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. at 74. 
 119.  625 A.2d 959 (Md. 1993). 
 120.  Id. at 961. 
 121.  Id. at 964. 
 122.  Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
 123.  See Erica Goldberg, Emotional Distress, 47 CONN. L. REV. 809, 824 (2015) 
(Describing resistance to “stand alone” emotional distress cases that are not parasitic 
to other economic losses) [hereinafter Emotional Duties]. 
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employment law,124 defamation,125 and privacy.126  IIED works 
best when it accompanies a legislative cause of action that 
evidences a public policy to protect against emotional distress.  
Accordingly, we turn to the question of whether the common law 
already provides public policy support for preventing purposefully 
inflicted, if not intentionally inflicted, emotional distress. 
III.  EXPLORING NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL 
DISTRESS AS A COMPANION TORT 
As noted in Goldberg’s seminal article on emotional distress, 
the conduct involved in cases at the extreme of free market 
practices can often be analyzed under both negligence and 
IIED.127  Some courts may balk at seeing enough of a specific 
intent to harm individual patients and feel uncomfortable with 
the intent element being met.  In anticipation of such a reaction, 
this Essay next examines whether a cause of action for NIED 
provides companion support for recovery by a patient in an 
exorbitant pricing case. 
This Part first summarizes the tort duties to “rescue,” or to 
come to the aid of, another, as well as the limitations on those 
duties of protection of others from emotional harms.  The Part 
then examines exceptions to those exceptions, located in cases 
involving direct breaches of duty to specifically identifiable 
plaintiffs, which, in turn, cause emotional harm.  Part A. begins 
with an overview of tort law affirmative duty.  Again, tort law 
provides a well-grounded basis for courts to conclude that a class 
of patients has been subjected to a tort: NIED from defendants’ 
pricing practices. 
A.  CURRENT LAW 
First, a quick overview of tort law concerning affirmative 
duty.128  One paradox in this area of law is that it recognizes 
 
 124.  Duffy, supra note 111, at 392. 
 125.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 47 (AM. LAW INST. 2012). 
 126.  Eugene Volokh, Evolution of the Duty of Care: Some Thoughts, 114 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1, 24 (2014).  
 127.  Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of 
Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 
82 COLUM. L. REV. 42, 56 (1982). 
 128.  What is immediately apparent is that tort law appears to contain a number 
of paradoxes regarding the way it views and judges human nature. Its goals are both 
to provide compensation and encourage risk-taking. It requires only reasonable 
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individuals as responsible for their own actions and safety.129  
However, affirmative duty also recognizes that much of what 
happens to people is a product of other causes, whether natural or 
simply accidental.130  In situations where a plaintiff could not 
have taken reasonable precautions, affirmative duty may demand 
compensation from a defendant, but only where there exists proof 
that the defendant’s actions are the cause of the harm to a 
plaintiff.131  And, while affirmative duty provides for the freedom 
to act (so long as that act does not cause harm),132 it only requires 
that a person take action to prevent harm where there exists a 
special relationship to the one injured,133 to a person whose acts 
they have a duty to control,134 or where there is a direct and 
immediately foreseeable harm that would result from the failure 
to act.135 
In some jurisdictions, affirmative duty provides judges with 
the responsibility to find affirmative duties in new situations and 
relationships.136  For example, some state courts have ruled that 
food and drug retailers have a duty to inspect their products and 
to protect their customers from injury.137  In other cases (in 
California, in particular), courts have placed the responsibility of 
imposing affirmative duties with juries.138  The modern majority 
rule is that judges are to make duty determinations in individual 
cases.139  Professor Leon Green, known to many as the “Dean of 
Tort Law,” points out the confusing state of this element in tort 
doctrine: 
How does the stating of the problem in terms of duties 
enable a judge to pass judgment?  Where shall he [or 
she] find the source of duties?  Do judges find them 
ready made?  Do they assume them?  Do they create 
 
behavior, but demands compensation where the injured is innocent. It sees cause as 
requiring only cause in fact and yet only counts causes it determines to be “legal” or 
“proximate.” 
 129.  Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014, 
1024 (1928). 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 397 (1852). 
 138.  See supra notes 65-67. 
 139.  Green, supra note 129, at 1024. 
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them, and if so, do they create them in wholesale, or 
must each court create a particular duty which fits the 
particular case before it?  So far as I have been able to 
discover, the common law courts have stumbled 
through the whole period of their existence without 
committing themselves on this inquiry.  Perhaps it is 
a subject which is not to be talked about.  We are 
clearly dealing with the very processes by which law is 
generated.  And doubtless the questions as to the 
paternity of these duties brought forth in case after 
case is embarrassing enough at best.140 
Judges often answer the duty question by establishing that, 
absent a special relationship between the actor and plaintiff, and 
absent specific foreseeability of injury, there is no duty to act 
where the defendant has “not acted,” and the case, therefore, is 
one of nonfeasance.141  Where the defendant’s actions cause harm, 
that defendant’s acts are judged according to the “reasonably 
prudent person” standard.142 
Justice Holmes is one of the prime defenders of the fault 
principle in tort law: to be liable in tort, the defendant must be “at 
fault” or “blameworthy.”143  Inherent to fault, Homes finds, is that 
the defendant must have acted.144  Holmes, as the originator and 
defender of this nonfeasance misfeasance division of tort law,145 
makes four arguments for the fault principle: (1) the general 
principle of law is that people are free to act in society and loss 
from an accident must lay where it falls, and its corollary, that 
state interference that shifts responsibility absent active fault is 
an evil when it cannot be shown to be good;146 (2) the words 
commonly associated with fault require the person to act, and the 
term “act” implies choice;147 (3) the public generally profits from 
individuals acting;148 and (4) to impose liability without an act, or 
fault, would violate a sense or common intuition of justice.149 
On the other hand, common intuitions or senses of justice 
 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW AND OTHER WRITINGS 94-96 
(Univ. Press 1881) (emphasis added). 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Id. 
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also argue in favor of imposing liability even where the defendant 
has not been said to have acted.150  As many first year torts 
students learn in their casebooks, we are to put our own intuitions 
for justice and morality on hold when it comes to imposing liability 
for nonfeasance.151 
It turns out that it is more difficult to distinguish acts of 
misfeasance and acts of nonfeasance in the real world.  For 
example, if a person is involved in a car accident where one car 
pulls out in front of a driver who has the right of way, the problem 
for the driver can be framed as the driver’s driving too fast for the 
conditions, driving negligently, the driver’s failure to stop in time, 
or his failure to keep a proper look out, depending on the 
conditions.  If framed the first way, the act is said to be 
misfeasance, and if framed the second way it is said to be 
nonfeasance.152  Is the distinction then arbitrary?  Commenting 
on the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance, Justice 
Cardoza stated: 
It is ancient learning that one who assumes to act, 
even though gratuitously, may thereby become subject 
to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all.  The 
plaintiff would bring its case within the orbit of that 
principle.  The hand once set to a task may not always 
be withdrawn with impunity though liability would 
fail if it had never been applied at all.  A time-honored 
formula often phrases the distinction as one between 
misfeasance and non-feasance.  Incomplete the 
formula is, and so at times misleading.  Given a 
relation involving in its existence a duty of care 
irrespective of a contract, a tort may result as well 
from acts of omission as of commission in the 
fulfillment of the duty thus recognized by law.  What 
we need to know is not so much the conduct to be 
avoided when the relations and its attendant duty are 
 
 150.  Feminists argue for such a duty. See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer’s Primer on 
Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 4 (1988). 
 151.  Commentators are often quoted in trying to defend and socialize the lawyer 
into accepting the nonfeasance distinction as being the right one, including James 
Ames, Richard Epstein, and Richard Posner (who is brought in to explore the morality 
of a duty to rescue rule). See, e.g., Marcia M. Ziegler, Comment, Nonfeasance and the 
Duty to Assist: The American Seinfeld Syndrome, 104 DICK. L. REV. 525, 528 (2000); 
Richard Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 194 (1973); 
Richard W. Wright, Hand, Posner, and the Myth of the “Hand Formula”, 4 
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 145, 150-51 (2003). 
 152.  See Bender, supra note 150, at 4. 
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established as existing.  What we need to know is the 
conduct that engenders the relation.  It is here that 
the formula, however incomplete, has its value and 
significance.  If conduct has gone forward to such a 
stage that inaction would commonly result, not 
negatively merely in withholding a benefit, but 
positively or actively in working an injury, there exists 
a relation out of which arises a duty to go forward. . . . 
The query always is whether the putative wrongdoer 
has advanced to such a point as to have launched a 
force or instrument of harm, or has stopped where 
inaction is at most a refusal to become an instrument 
for good.153 
Individualism had its limitations in particular acts that the 
defendant may have taken, and the particular relationships the 
actor may have been in at the time.154  In other words, driving a 
car might, by itself, put a person in a relationship with other 
drivers on the road, just as in maritime law, where ship captains 
owed duties to help other ships based on the commonality of their 
endeavors.155 
In spite of the push for individualism, the common law has 
developed significant exceptions to the “no duty” rule.  First, an 
exception exists where an individual stands in an already 
recognized or special relationship with the plaintiff or victim (e.g., 
a school teacher and a child in that teacher’s class).156  The second 
exception is where an individual stands in a special relationship 
with a person they have a duty to control (e.g., parent controlling 
their child from harming another child).157  The third exception 
most specifically involves application of the “Good Samaritan” 
ideal.158  This ideal implicates the creation of a duty where a 
person has special knowledge of the potential for harm to a 
 
 153.  H.R. Moch Co., Inc., v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 898 (N.Y. App. 
1928) (internal quotations omitted) (internal citations omitted).  Justice Cardoza goes 
on to hold that a contract for providing a city water did not give rise to a duty to the 
citizens individually.  Id. at 899. 
 154.  See Bender, supra note 148, at 4. 
 155.  See id. 
 156.  Thomas J. Murphy, Affirmative Duties in Tort Following Tarasoff, 58 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 492, 507 (1984). 
 157.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. c (Am. Law Inst. 1965); F. 
H. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 
217, 219-21 (1908); Fowler V. Harper & P.M. Kline, The Duty to Control the Conduct 
of Another, 43 YALE L.J. 886, 886 (1934); McNiece & Thornton, Affirmative Duties in 
Tort, 58 YALE L.J. 1272, 1287-88 (1949). 
 158.  See McNiece & Thornton, supra note 157, at 1287-88. 
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particular person and a concomitant obligation (where little 
burden, cost, or damage exists) to come to the aid of that person.159 
B.  THE “GOOD SAMARITAN EXCEPTION” 
The aforementioned “Good Samaritan” exception is 
represented in three relevant California cases, which arose out of 
a foreseeability of harm: (1) Tarasoff v. Regents of the University 
of California,160 (2) Thompson v. County of Alameda,161 and (3) 
Saldono v. O’Daniels.162  Each case is discussed in more detail 
below. 
1.  Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California 
In October 1969, Proenjit Poddar (Poddar) murdered Tatiana 
Tarasoff (decedent).163  The decedent’s parents (the Tarasoffs) 
brought suit against the University of California, where Poddar 
had been seeing a therapist.  The Tarasoffs contended that, only 
a short time prior to decedent’s murder, Poddar had expressed, in 
a session with his therapist (employed by the University of 
California), that he planned to kill decedent.164  The Tarasoffs 
alleged that although the therapist had notified campus police of 
Poddar’s intentions, the police released Poddar after only briefly 
detaining him.165  The parents asserted two grounds for their 
action: (1) the failure to confine Poddar despite his expressed 
intention to kill decedent, and (2) the failure to warn decedent or 
her parents of Poddar’s intentions.166  The University of California 
maintained that it owed no duty of care to the decedent, and that 
it was immune from suit.167 
The court held that the University therapist had a duty to 
warn based on his knowledge that Poddar was likely to carry out 
his threat against decedent, and that this duty was breached 
when only the police, not decedent were notified.168  This holding 
was made in spite of the fact that the therapist lacked the legal 
 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). 
 161.  614 P.2d 728 (Cal. 1980). 
 162.  190 Cal. Rptr. 310 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). 
 163.  Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 339. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. at 339-40. 
 166.  Id. at 340. 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Id. 
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ability to control the acts of Poddar.169  At the most, the 
University’s duty to decedent rode parasitic to its duty to Poddar, 
the patient.  Tarasoff, therefore, is widely viewed as support for 
the proposition that a legal duty can arise out of the foreseeability 
of harm to a third party. 
2.  Thompson v. County of Alameda 
In Thompson, James, a juvenile offender, had been in the 
custody of the County and confined in an institution for a prior 
incident.170  The County was aware that James had “latent, 
extremely dangerous and violent propensities regarding young 
children and that sexual assaults upon young children and 
violence connected therewith were a likely result of releasing 
[him] into the community.”171  The County was also aware that 
James had specifically stated that if he were released, he would 
“take the life of a young child residing in the neighborhood” where 
James lived.172  Despite the knowledge of James’ intentions, the 
County released him on temporary leave into his mother’s custody 
at her home,173 and never advised the parents of the young 
children in the neighborhood of James’ statements and threats.174  
Within twenty-four hours of his release, James murdered a young 
boy in the neighborhood.175 
The court in Thompson distinguished Tarasoff on the basis 
that James’ threat, as opposed to Poddar’s, was not directed at 
any particular person,176 and, therefore, was not sufficiently 
“foreseeable” to give rise to a duty to warn.177  In his dissent, 
Justice Tobriner argued that the holding in Tarasoff was not 
dependent on the knowledge of a particular victim, but was 
dependent on foreseeability of harm to a person.178 
In any event, it is important to note that, in cases where 
pharmaceutical companies are selling to patients, they may 
 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Thompson, 614 P.2d at 72. 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. at 76. 
 177.  Id. at 76-77 (“Although the intended victim as a precondition to liability need 
not be specifically named, he must be ‘readily identifiable.’”) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 178.  Id. at 81-82. 
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already be in a relationship that gives rise to a duty of care, 
(unless with each prescription, the duty ends when the medicine 
is consumed).  Therefore, these companies must provide warning 
of the harmful effects of their drugs,179 and may have a duty to 
pull their drugs from the market should they learn of drug defects 
that exist.180  In other words, these pharmaceutical companies 
already have duty of care, and the question is whether such duty 
covers action that cause emotional harm.  The importance of an 
existing relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff was 
made clear in Soldano. 
3.  Soldano v. Daniels 
In Soldano, a Good Samaritan entered a public 
establishment and asked an employee if he could use the 
telephone to call the police when a patron at a nearby saloon had 
been threatened.181  The employee refused, and a man was 
subsequently shot and killed at the saloon.182  The daughter of the 
victim sued the public establishment for wrongful death, alleging 
that the establishment owed a legal duty to the victim, and that 
the establishment breached that duty when its employee refused 
access to the telephone.183  The court held that a duty did exist for 
the for-profit, public establishment to come to the aid to someone 
in danger.184 
Thus, in the case of a pharmaceutical company selling a drug, 
which, by its nature, is used to prevent a medical emergency from 
occurring, the duty must be stronger than one that runs between 
a public establishment and the public.  In a pharmaceutical drug 
situation, there is no dispute about the nature of the emergency, 
the foreseeability of harm, or the identity of those who will be 
harmed by exorbitant pricing.  The harm is to everyone who is 
faced with the choice of whether or not they should purchase the 
drug. 
 
 179.  See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 11 (Am. 
Law Inst. 1997). 
 180.  See M. Stuart Madden, Modern Post-Sale Warnings and Related Obligations, 
27 PACE L. FAC. PUBLICATIONS 33, 57 (2000); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 13(a)(I), (2) (Am. Law Inst. 1997). Section 13(b) provides indicia 
for determining whether “[a] reasonable person in the position of the successor would 
provide a warning.” Id. 
 181.  Soldano, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 312. 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  Id. at 317. 
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In Soldano, the California Supreme Court found that, a legal 
duty, which corresponded with a moral duty, was at the heart of 
what the common law is meant to provide.185  The court further 
quoted from Francis Bohlen’s article, The Moral Duty to Aid 
Others as a Basis of Tort Liability: 
Nor does it follow that because the law has not as yet 
recognized the duty to repair harm innocently 
wrought, that it will continue indefinitely to refuse it 
recognition.  While it is true that the common law does 
not attempt to enforce all moral, ethical, or 
humanitarian duties, it is, it is submitted, equally true 
that all ethical and moral conceptions, which are not 
the mere temporary manifestations of a passing wave 
of sentimentalism or puritanism, but on the contrary, 
find a real and permanent place in the settled 
convictions of a race and become part of the normal 
habit of thought thereof, of necessity do in time color 
the judicial conception of legal obligation. . . . While 
courts of law should not yield to every passing current 
of popular though, nonetheless, it appears inevitable 
that unless they adopt as legal those popular 
standards which they themselves, as men, regard as 
just and socially practicable, but which, as judges, 
they refuse to recognize solely because they are not the 
standards of the past of Brian, of Rolle, of Fineux, and 
of Coke; they will more and more lose their distinctive 
common law character as part of the machinery 
whereby free men do justice among themselves.186 
The Soldano court concluded, citing Rowland v. Christian: 
We turn now to the concept of duty in a tort case.  The 
Supreme Court has identified certain factors to be 
considered in determining whether a duty is owed to 
third persons.  These factors include: “the 
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of 
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the 
closeness of the connection between the defendant’s 
conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame 
attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of 
preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to 
the defendant and consequences to the community of 
 
 185.  See id. at 312-13. 
 186.  Id. at 313 (quoting Francis Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis 
of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 316 (1908)). 
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imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting 
liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and 
prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.”187 
Soldano stands for the common law’s recognition of the 
relationship between moral duty and legal duty.  It reminds other 
courts that they are not powerless to act to address the emotional 
harm caused by the reckless and amoral reasoning of the market. 
C.  DUTY TO AID OTHERS AND PROTECTION FROM 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
While emotional distress damages are awarded in cases 
where there is physical harm, courts have raised the proof 
requirements in order for plaintiffs to recover in cases where 
harm is solely emotional.188  Accordingly, where there is a claim 
for NIED, the plaintiff typically must prove that his emotional 
distress is a result of some contemporaneous sensory 
observation,189 or that he was in the zone of danger or target 
zone,190 in relation to harm caused to a close family member.  
Otherwise, a flood of litigation may result.191  A court may also be 
wary that the claimed emotional distress was faked, or that it was 
not as substantial as claimed.192 
Yet, the practice of exorbitant drug pricing fits nicely into an 
exception to these cases, because patients’ emotional distress does 
not depend on harm to others (though family members might 
share in the emotional distress), it is based on harm that is 
undoubtedly experienced by the patients themselves.  As such, 
these cases are more akin to NIED cases involving emotional 
distress based on instances such as the misreporting of medical 
conditions or death,193 the mishandling of dead bodies by a funeral 
 
 187.  Soldano, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 315 (quoting Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 
113 (Cal. 1968), superseded by statute, CAL. CIV. CODE § 847 (West 1985), as recognized 
in Calvillo-Silva v. Home Grocery, 18 Cal. 4th 714 (1998).  
 188.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 6 cmt. f; 
Kircher, supra note 91, at 806. 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 828 (Cal. 1989); Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 
912, 915 (Cal. 1968); Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513, 524 (Cal. 
1963), overruled by Dillon v. Legg 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968). See Richard N. Pearson, 
Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm – A Comment on the 
Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 477, 506 (1982).  
 192.  Aaron Smith, The 9/11 fund: Putting a price on life, CNN MONEY (Sept. 7, 
2011), http://money.cnn.com/2011/09/06/news/economy/911_compensation_fund/. 
 193.  James C. Maroulis, Can HIV-Negative Plaintiffs Recover Emotional Distress 
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home or hospital,194 or distress suffered by an insured as a result 
of a bad faith denial of his or her insurance claim.195  Additionally, 
as described above, a patient enters into a relationship with a 
drug manufacturer once that patient is prescribed a drug by their 
doctor, and takes that drug under an existing price.  Indeed, the 
price hike might occur in the midst of an ongoing treatment where 
the doctor’s prescription includes regular refills.  If the 
manufacturer learns of a defect in the drug that is not known to 
consumers, then that manufacturer clearly has a pre-existing 
duty to warn the consumers about the defect.196  Where there is a 
pre-existing duty, formed by a relationship that exists between 
market actor and patient, the cause of action does not depend on 
the plaintiff’s relationship to others, it depends on the actor’s 
relationship to its patient-customer.  Moreover, where the 
emotional distress rides parasitic to the direct economic harm 
suffered, the requirements of NIED are most likely satisfied.197 
Assuming a colorable and plausible claim can be made by a 
particular plaintiff for either IIED or NIED, it must next be 
determined whether a class action might be brought on behalf of 
all those plaintiffs who are taking the drug.  If such a class could 
be certified, there would be obviously significant advantages to 
those patients bargaining for a lower priced drug.  And, with the 
certified class subsequently garnering the attention of the 
pharmaceutical company, the company would be able to 
sufficiently lower its exposure to continuing distress claims by 
lowering its price of the drug (and whatever punitive damages 
that might otherwise be justified).  One might expect that a price 
increase for a particular drug would create enough commonality 
 
Damages for Their Fear of AIDS? 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 225, 225 (1993). 
 194.  See, e.g., Wilson v. Houston Funeral Home, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 169, 173 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1996) (involving a mortician’s contract to prepare a body for burial that was 
negligently performed, causing emotional distress) 
 195.  See, e.g., Olson v. Rugloski, 277 N.W.2d 385, 387-88 (Minn. 1979) (finding an 
insurer’s liability for refusal to pay benefits includes liability for lost profits that are a 
direct and proximate result of breach). 
 196.  Canto v. Ametek, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 873, 878 (Mass. 1985). See also 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 10 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 1997) 
(“Courts recognize that warnings about risks discovered after sale are sometimes 
necessary to prevent significant harm to persons and property.”). See generally 
Michael L. Matula, Manufacturer’s Post-Sale Obligations in the 1990’s, 32 TORT & INS. 
L.J. 87, 87-88 (1996). 
 197.  See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 616 P.2d 813, 820 (Cal. 1980) (en 
banc) (“We agree that the unqualified requirement of physical injury is no longer 
justifiable.”). See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 334-35 (4th 
ed. 1971). (noting that duty and breach are essential elements of a negligence cause of 
action). 
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of injury to allow each patient to qualify as a member of a class.  
On the other hand, defendants would be quick to arguer that, 
where some patients’ insurance plans cover the drugs regardless 
of the price, there is little in the way of emotional distress that 
would allow patients whose plans cover the drug regardless of the 
price or where Medicare plans provide coverage to claim injuries.  
Without injury, there is no standing.198 
Again, the element for damages under a claim for NIED can 
be proved through the same arguments we see made in IIED 
cases.  The proof of damages is found in the reckless indifference 
for delivering price hike information to patients in the throes of 
fighting life-threatening diseases.199  In addition, just as with 
negligent delivery of misinformation to loved ones concerning the 
death of a family member, proof of distress can be presumed as 
growing out of both the common vulnerability concerning news 
about death and the lack of resilience, in particular, experienced 
by those left behind.  Further, the “physical” harm threatened by 
disease, itself, along with the threat to receiving lifesaving 
medication, puts patients and their loved ones squarely in the 
“zone of danger.”200 
As we will see, commonality of the distress caused should be 
sufficient for class certification, at least for the purpose of 
negotiating a lower price, and might be sufficient to provide the 
adequate incentive for an adequate remedy.201  This is especially 
true where cases involve a defendant’s takeover of existing drugs 
and their subsequent changes in pricing.  These cases might also 
seek to enjoin the price increase on the basis of Rule 65 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which permits injunctions in 
cases where there exists a burden to the plaintiffs in excess of that 
on the defendant, and where an adequate remedy at law cannot 
be obtained.202  Before getting to the question of remedy, however, 
 
 198.  See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (“To establish an 
Art. III case or controversy, a litigant must first clearly demonstrate that he has 
suffered an ‘injury in fact.’”). 
 199.  Pollack & Tavernise, supra note 1. 
 200.  See Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1300 (Mass. 1978). 
 201.  For example, in cases brought by individuals against banks for data breaches 
(invasions of privacy), some courts have held that, where there is no showing of harm, 
there is no foul. Alan Charles Raul & Edward McNicholas, Federal Court of Appeals 
Dismisses Data Breach Class Action Following Hack of Bank’s Marketing Web Site, 
PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY L.J. (Oct. 2007), available at 
http://www.sidley.com/~/media/Files/Publications/2007/10/Federal%20Court%20of%2
0Appeals%20Dismisses%20Data%20Breach%20C__/Files/View%20PDF/FileAttachm
ent/Pisciotta. 
 202.  FED. R. CIV. P. 65. 
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these cases will be able to obtain price relief if they are able to get 
over the hurdle of class certification. 
IV.  CLASS ACTIONS, OR WAIT FOR LEGISLATION? 
A.  CLASS ACTIONS CAN LEAD TO PRICE REDUCTIONS. 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) is the 
starting point in any analysis of class action lawsuits.203  To 
qualify as a class action under FRCP 23, the case must satisfy the 
four prerequisites of Rule 23(a): (1), numerosity, (2) commonality, 
(3) typicality, and (4) adequacy.204  Federal case law is fairly 
liberal in finding the four prerequisites under Rule 23(a) 
requirements.205  As a result, it is usually difficult for the 
defendant to satisfy these requirements.206 
A defendant’s use of Rule 23(b), however, presents plaintiffs 
with more significant challenges.  In addition to satisfying all 
requirements under Rule 23(a), federal class actions require that 
plaintiffs satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(b).  The majority of 
class actions seek certification pursuant to Rule 23(b), which 
states, in part: 
[T]he court finds that the questions of law or fact 
common to class members predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members, and that 
a class action is superior to other available methods 
for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. 
Additionally, Rule 23(b)(3) provides that the matters pertinent to 
the findings include: 
[T]he class members’ interests in individually 
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate 
actions; the extent and nature of any litigation 
concerning the controversy already begun by or 
against class members; the desirability or 
undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the 
claims in the particular forum; and the likely 
 
 203.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 204.  Janet Cooper Alexander, An Introduction to Class Action Procedure in the 
United States (2000), from Conference, Debates Over Group Litigation in Comparative 
Perspective, available at 
https://www.law.duke.edu/grouplit/papers/classactionalexander.pdf. 
 205.  Id. at 4. 
 206.  Id. 
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difficulties in managing a class action.207 
Amassing the damages claims of a large number of class 
members supports a claim for a large amount of attorney’s fees, 
and poses a severe financial threat to a defendant.208  Thus, 
plaintiffs often focus on a defendant’s arguments opposing 
proposed Rule 23(b)(3) classes.209  Most states have rules that 
parallel Rule 23.210  Additionally, most state supreme courts 
interpret those rules by following the federal decisions that 
interpret Rule 23.211 
B.  CLASS ACTION CHALLENGES 
In order for the advantages of using tort law to address the 
problem of exorbitant drug prices, there remains the question of 
whether the courts will also permit all users of a particular drug—
subject to the price increases—to join as a class for the purposes 
of pursuing a remedy.212  The court may balk at certification of a 
class because it might not view state tort law across jurisdictions 
as being adequately uniform, to make for a common question of 
law.213  In addition, a court may not view each patient as being 
able to establish the level of “severe emotional distress” required 
to be successful in pursuing the remedy.  Some patients may be 
covered by Cadillac insurance plans, some may end up paying 
substantially less out-of-pocket because of their insurance plans, 
or because of the amount covered by Medicare or backed by 
Medicaid.  Some patients, on the other hand, may simply be 
oblivious to the cost of the drugs.  These variations may, in effect, 
cause the common questions of law to fail the predominance 
requirement. 
 
 207.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(A)-(D). 
 208.  Alexander, supra note 204. 
 209.  Caroline H. Gebtry, American Bar Association: Corporate Counsel CLE 
Seminar, A Primer On Class Certification Under Federal Rule 23 (Feb. 16, 2014), 
available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/201
4_corporate_counselcleseminar/b2_2_a_primer_class_certification_under_federal_rul
e.authcheckdam.pdf.  
 210.  CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1753.1 
(Thomson West ed. 2009). 
 211. Id. 
 212.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(A)-(D). 
 213.  Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 624 (1997). Alexander, supra 
note 204, at 4. I hope that the foregoing analysis alleviates these concerns by showing 
the cause of action exists and has common requirements in all fifty states. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (Am. Law Inst. 1965). 
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While the above variations may present significant 
challenges to plaintiffs, the unity of the legal question presented 
and the equity of allowing for the collective bargaining of the 
patient group for a reasonable price should overcome these 
objections.214  The courts have done as much in consumer rights 
cases,215 civil rights cases,216 asbestos cases,217 various medical 
device cases (silicone breast implants as the most prominent 
example),218 and products liability cases (including cases 
involving Volkswagen and General Motors).219 
After the famous Wal-Mart case,220 where 1.5 million female 
employees accused Wal-Mart of discrimination against women in 
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and where 
the Supreme Court denied class certification for failure of proof 
that individual employment decisions were motivated by 
discrimination, the issue in most class certifications may come 
down to expert testimony on the issue of damages.221  Such 
instances could involve a Daubert challenge222 on whether an 
expert can provide sufficient support that a portion of the class 
experienced significant emotional distress due to the actions of 
the defendant.223  This hurdle, however, can be met by an expert 
 
 214.  Alexander, supra note 204, at 5-10. 
 215.  Id. 
 216.  Id. 
 217.  Id. 
 218.  David E. Bernstein, The Breast Implant Fiasco, 87 CAL. L. REV. 457, 457-510 
(1999). 
 219.  In re: Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” MDL, 15-MD-2672-CRB (JSC), available at 
http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/crb/vwmdl; In re: General Motors LLC Ignition Switch 
Litigation, Case No. 1:14-md-02543-JMF, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York. 
 220.  Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553 (2011). 
 221.  See id. 
 222.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 223.  Id. Support for this approach comes from court holdings in analogous cases in 
England and Australia. See Andrews and Ors v. Australia & New Zealand Banking 
Group Ltd. [2012] HCA 30, available at http://www.hcourt.gov.au/cases/case_m48-
2012?Itemid=62&qh=YToxOntpOjA7czozOiJhbnoiO30%3D. It appears two cases 
before the United Kingdom Supreme Court involved the issue of genuine pre-estimate 
damages and were heard in July 2015. See ParkingEye Ltd. v. Beavis (2015) (UKSC); 
Cavendish Square Holding BV v. Talal El Makdessi (2015) (UKSC). The court in 
ParkingEye. agreed with the owners of the Riverside Retail Park to manage the car 
park at the site. ParkingEye Ltd. (2015) (UKSC) [119]. ParkingEye displayed 
numerous notices throughout the car park, saying that a failure to comply with a two-
hour time limit would “result in a Parking Charge of £85.” Id. On April 15, 2014, Beavis 
parked in the car park, but overstayed the two-hour limit by almost an hour. Id. at 
[92]. Beavis argued that the £85 charge was unenforceable at common law as a 
penalty, and that it was unfair and unenforceable by virtue of the Unfair Terms in 
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analysis that presents a look at the specific impact on different 
classes of patients, including individual uninsured patients and 
those patients who do not qualify for Medicaid to see how high 
deductibles will bleed family savings.  The expert should be able 
to provide evidence using healthcare statistics to a devastating 
effect on these classes of patients, forcing some to choose between 
food, education, and basic necessities, or paying for the deductible 
and causing, at the very least, anxiety.  For those many on 
Medicare, the issue can be their deductibles.  Often, the 
deductible can be up to $1,600 per month,224 and could also 
include paying a “donut hole” amount, where Medicare requires 
patient payment prior to providing access to additional 
coverage.225 
Importantly, as will become plain from the discussion in Part 
III, with respect to ways in which to avoid the problems of 
individualization that can arise from litigation approaches to the 
development of compensation for injury victims, the experts’ 
analysis should not end in segregating harm to subgroups of 
patients.226  The plaintiffs’ counsel should not segregate patients 
into their financial situations, for, as we will see using the Barton 
and Burke analysis, this would only pit groups of patients against 
each other, and end up pushing off the higher prices onto those 
less severely injured emotionally.  In the cases against Turing and 
Valeant, the difference between the pre-takeover price of the drug 
and the post-takeover price should provide sufficient evidence of 
significant anxiety for their individual economic situation, to 
overcome the commonality hurdle. 
In the alternative, a court might choose to exercise its 
settlement oversight responsibilities227 by requiring that the 
expert suggest a price that would fairly provide for the value of 
the drug in the market—with an eye towards its development 
costs—and manufacturing costs, as well as a reasonable return.228  
In this regard, the expert would likely turn to other markets to 
 
Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. Id. at [119]. The Court of Appeals upheld the 
decision that rejected Beavis’ arguments. Id. at [214]; see also Cavendish Square 
Holding BV (2015) (UKSC) [214].  
 224.  Medicare Part D Donut Hole – Medicare Coverage Gap, eHealth Medicare, 
http://www.ehealthmedicare.com/medicare-part-d-prescription/donut-hole/ (last 
visited Aug. 24, 2016). 
 225.  Id. 
 226.  See supra, Part III. B. 
 227.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). See also Alexander, supra note 204, at 9. 
 228.  Id. 
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determine the value of the drug or similar drugs.229  The expert 
might provide information using a “price referencing” model,230 
such as that employed by the Canadian government in 
determining what it will pay for a drug.231  This method is also 
used in Europe to determine the price the insurance providers will 
pay for the drugs.232 
It is important to note that in setting a drug’s price, the court 
should require the expert to provide an opinion on a price for the 
drug for the class of patients as a whole.  Otherwise, the 
unintended effect on lowering the price for Medicare patients will 
likely raise the price for everyone else.233  This is the exact effect 
Congress was worried about when it prohibited Medicare from 
negotiating lower prices for drugs.234  If this were to be a court’s 
requirements for pricing class actions, the insurance companies 
may even join these cases on behalf of their patients.  Their 
interests are aligned regarding pricing, for while their insureds 
are protected, they all pay for drugs far in excess of the drugs’ 
anticipated costs (and premiums charged).  The unjust 
enrichment that occurs to the drug company comes from the 
antitrust prohibitions on insurers to collectively bargain for drug 
prices.235  Insurers are held hostage by the “free market” to pay 
the exorbitant prices.  Absent the lawsuit, they have no means to 
“negotiate” for lower prices for individual patients with those drug 
needs. 
Other arguments for certifying a class of all drug users of a 
particular life-saving drug, despite the exact commonality and 
severity of their emotional distress, comes from the monopoly 
 
 229.  Rugerri & Nolte, supra note 8. 
 230.  Id. 
 231.  Id. 
 232.  Rugerri & Nolte, supra note 8 (reporting on how value is determined on an 
internal price referencing model). 
 233.  See Robert H. Ballance, Market and Industrial Structure, in CONTESTED 
GROUND: PUBLIC PURPOSE AND PRIVATE INTEREST IN THE REGULATION OF 
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 95, 103-104 (Peter Davis ed., 1996); David J. Gross et al., Prices 
for Prescription Drugs: The Roles of Market Forces and Government Regulation, in 
Contested Ground 124, 134; PATRICIA M. DANZON, PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE 
REGULATION: NATIONAL POLICIES VERSUS GLOBAL INTERESTS 3-4 (1997), available at 
https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/-pharmaceutical-price-regulation-
global-interests_11361924090.pdf. 
 234.  See Hogberg, supra note 34.  
 235.  Editorial Board, Sneaky Ways to Raise Drug Profits, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/08/opinion/sneaky-ways-to-raise-drug-
profits.html?_r=1. See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013); Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585.  
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effect on the markets of patents236—and the lack of transparency 
and information in the market concerning competitive drugs, 
generics, and prices.237  Again, without a class certification, not 
even collective bargaining can overcome the monopoly effect of the 
patent in the case of life-saving drugs.  Instead of involving the 
government or a bureaucracy as the representative of the 
patients, the advantage of the class action tort lawsuit is that the 
patients’ attorney acts as a direct representative of the group.238 
C.  ADVERSARIAL LITIGATION VS. LEGISLATIVE 
REGULATION 
Assuming then, at least for settlement purposes, that a class 
could be certified, there are a number of advantages that would 
 
 236.  By definition, patents grant a monopoly. David R. Henderson, Patents, THE 
CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/Patents.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2016). 
 237.  Jeffrey C. Lerner, Daniel M. Fox, Todd Nelson & John B. Reiss, The 
Consequence of Secret Prices: The Politics of Physician Preference Items, 6 HEALTH 
AFFAIRS 1560 (2008).  
 238.  Rugerri & Nolte, supra note 8, at 16-17. There are two different types of 
pricing. The first is “external reference” pricing, which refers to the cost of the same 
drugs in “baskets” of other markets the country selects for comparison prices. The 
second is called “internal pricing,” and allows some room for higher prices for new 
drugs, based on their value in the market, and based on their costs to manufacture. 
Id. There is no clear winner between these two different models. Id. Rugerri and Nolte 
describe the French system with respect to “how value is determined”: 
[T]he Transparency Commission at the French National Authority 
for Health determines the added therapeutic benefit for all new 
drugs, the amelioration du service médical rendu (ASMR). The 
Transparency Commission distinguishes five ASMR levels: 
I. [M]ajor improvement (new therapeutic area, reduction of 
morality) 
II. [S]ignificant improvement in efficacy and/or reduction of side-
effects 
III. [M]odest improvement in efficacy and/or reduction of side-
effects 
IV. [M]inor improvement 
V. [N]o improvement 
New pharmaceutical products are evaluated according to the following criteria: 
 [E]ffectiveness and possible side-effects 
 [P]osition in the therapeutic spectrum relative to other 
[A]vailable treatments 
 [S]everity of disease or condition 
 [C]linical profile of the drug 
 [P]ublic health impact. 
There are no separate schemes for different categories of drugs.  All new 
drugs fall under the same scheme. Id. 
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redound to the patients and the U.S. healthcare consumer in 
general.  As a matter of policy, tort litigation can provide a 
superior approach to waiting for legislative action.  Barnes and 
Burke, in their book, “How Policy Shapes Politics: Rights, Courts, 
Litigation, and the Struggle Over Injury Compensation,”239 
analyze various approaches taken in the U.S. to address issues of 
injury compensation.240  The authors use a case study approach, 
examining Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) 
legislation, asbestos litigation, and vaccine injury compensation 
to help determine the advantages and disadvantages that exist as 
a result of taking an adversarial approach, rather than waiting 
for legislation to address a question of injury compensation.241  
Barnes and Burke anticipate four serious objections to 
adversarial litigation: 
(1) [I]t crowds out other forms of political action, 
especially lobbying for legislative change, (2) it is 
particularly “sticky” and path-dependent, potentially 
locking governments into bad policies, (3) it creates 
polarizing backlashes, and (4) it individualizes 
interests, thus undermining social solidarity.242 
Barnes and Burke determined that the first three objections 
are overstated, at least in the cases they studied.243  This Essay 
suggests that these same objections will also overstate difficulties 
to the use of the courts to remedy exorbitant pricing of lifesaving 
drugs.  For example, concerning the question of whether litigation 
will foreclose efforts on the legislative front, as of the time of this 
writing, Congress is conducting at least two hearings on the 
questions of high-priced drugs.244  Senator Bernie Sanders is 
leading the charge on behalf of Veterans,245 and others (e.g., 
Senator McCaskill) are investing through hearings on the Special 
Committee on Aging.246  On the other hand, election year in 
 
 239.  BARNES & BURKE, supra note 31. 
 240.  Id. at 15. 
 241.  Id. 
 242.  Id. 
 243.  Id. 
 244.  Sarah N. Lynch & Bill Berkot, Senate Panel Focuses on Toll of Valeant, 
Turing Drug Price Spikes, REUTERS (Dec. 8, 2015) http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
senate-drugs-hearing-idUSKBN0TS2LI20151209.. 
 245.  Press Release, Majority News, Senate Panel Probes Exorbitant Prices for 
Hepatitis C Dugs (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.veterans.senate.gov/newsroom/majority-
news/senate-panel-probes-exorbitant-prices-for-hepatitis-c-drugs. 
 246.  Senators Collins, McCaskill Announce that Former Turing CEO Martin 
Shkreli has Invoked the fifth Amendment, 114th Cong. (2016). 
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politics may make it very difficult for legislation to make its way 
through.  In any event, courts are unlikely to foreclose a 
legislative remedy, but may, in fact, educate the public to the 
problem and drum up support for any future legislative solution. 
Further, as to whether a litigation approach becomes “sticky” 
and path dependent, as in other areas of injury compensation,247 
there is nothing that locks a legislature in to court decisions with 
regard to common law torts.  On the contrary, the inability to 
create a legislative solution may, in part, be related to path 
dependencies that are created by other legislation.  For example, 
the Sherman Antitrust Act has already prohibited insurance 
companies from aligning in order to negotiate lower prices for 
drugs where the state does not already act to regulate pricing.248  
Since individual insureds are scattered across multiple insurance 
companies, the focus of patients is to get coverage from their 
insurance providers, not to pay lower prices for drugs.  On an 
individual patient basis, it is seldom worth it for insurance 
companies to litigate for lower prices, especially where they can 
pass on costs by raising insurance premiums.  Perhaps as 
insurance companies merge, these incentives will change.  On the 
other hand, the less competition among insurers also presents 
worrisome effects on user services and costs.249  If prices 
moderate, more companies may be able to compete with respect 
to the services they provide. 
To add to the path dependency problem caused by other 
legislation, Congress enacted healthcare legislation in 2003,250 
which prohibited Medicare from negotiating with drug companies 
for lower prices.251  Drug companies were worried that, by 
enlarging Medicare and shrinking state-funded Medicaid, their 
profits would be severely affected, restricting research and 
development for new drugs.252  Also, worried that giving the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) the power to 
 
 247.  BARNES & BURKE, supra note 31, at 15. 
 248.  The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides, in relevant part, that “the Sherman 
Act . . . shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business 
is not regulated by State law.” 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012). 
 249.  Hogberg, supra note 34. 
 250.  Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, 
Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066. 
 251.  Id.  
 252.  Negotiating for Lower Drug Costs in Medicare Part D, Nat’l Comm. to Pres. 
Soc. Sec. & Medicare, 
http://www.ncpssm.org/EntitledtoKnow/entryid/2061/negotiating-for-lower-drug-
costs-in-medicare-part-d (last visited Aug. 24, 2016). 
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negotiate lower prices would only raise the price of those drugs for 
private insurers,253 Congress seemingly elected for competition 
between insurers on the quality of the serves they provided rather 
than give the government the ability to use their collective 
bargaining power to moderate drug prices.  Accordingly, any 
legislation that would be designed to set prices would also have to 
take on the task of amending both antitrust legislation and other 
healthcare legislation. 
As we have seen, the courts’ equitable powers can overcome 
these legislative path dependencies without violating the 
legislation.254  Patients could bargain directly with drug 
companies for original or lower prices on lifesaving drugs.  
Insurance companies could be left to compete on the basis of the 
quality of services they provide, and there is no harm done to 
principles of antitrust law.  Moreover, should the need arise, 
legislatures can always overrule courts and preempt them. 
As to the third objection described by Barnes and Burke,255 
there appears to be little potential for backlash from court 
decisions against exorbitant drug pricing.  In fact, absent court 
decisions, the drug behavior may be normalized, hidden from view 
by the lack of transparency in the market.  Drug companies 
themselves may justify more increases, in light of the fact that 
“everyone” is doing it.  Court decisions are, at least initially, 
directed at individual companies masquerading as drug 
companies.  Assuming the court certifies a class of patients, there 
is little chance of backlash from private insurers or employer-
provided plans.  After all, these groups are in favor paying lower 
prices for lifesaving drugs. 
With respect to the fourth objection, Barnes and Burke do 
find some evidence to support the argument that adversarial 
litigation individualizes the injury compensation problem and 
potentially pits one patient, drug company, or insurance scheme 
against another when it comes to seeking remedies for a 
particular lifesaving drug.256  Next to be considered, then, is 
whether bringing individual class action cases for specific pricing 
of lifesaving will send adequate signals to drug manufacturers to 
moderate their pricing.  Or, would it be better to wait for a 
comprehensive approach to drug price regulation through 
legislation? 
 
 253.  Hogberg, supra note 34. 
 254.  BARNES & BURKE, supra note 33, at 17-20. 
 255.  Id. 
 256.  Id. 
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It is true that the courts will have difficult in deciding which 
drugs are classified as lifesaving drugs.  Drugs used to treat 
Cancer (including those to reduce tumors), to control debilitating 
pain, or to treat ailments of vital organs appear easy targets for 
price gouging without any tort effect.  But what about drugs that 
treat diabetes, high blood pressure, high cholesterol, depression, 
pneumonia, malaria, or various tropic diseases?  Will tort lawsuits 
end up pitting patients with various disease against one another 
in the process of their lobbying Congress to qualify as a lifesaving 
drug?  In addition, what about companies that come to the market 
with an exorbitant price, or those that have prices that increase 
more gradually over time?257  As has been shown, claims that 
qualify under IIED or NIED consist of facts where defendants 
take over existing drugs that have already established markets 
and pricing.  As such, these cases will not impact drug pricing 
needed for the development of new drugs.  Additionally, while 
drug companies may deal creatively with ways to hide exorbitant 
prices, their activities will create a paper trail that will eventually 
be noticed by individual patients.  Just as in the case of bad faith 
insurance, lawyers will be on the lookout for evidence of extreme 
and outrageous price increases, without justification, and respond 
with ways to uncover these practices. 
Finally, as discussed above, if a court only certifies as to 
Medicare or Medicaid patients, there is an additional 
individualization issue that may pit some insurers against others.  
On the other hand, if the court certifies the class for all patients 
taking the drug, then such an individualization issue will 
disappear.  Class certification, therefore, provides a mechanism 
to overcome the problems associated with individualization that 
are typically associated with adversarial litigation. 
It is true that, in the area of SSDI, legislation that treats all 
disabilities develops more efficient and effective protections than 
if each disability had to make its own individual case in the 
legislature or in court.258  And, for example, giving the power to 
the Veterans Administration to negotiate the price of drugs to 
treat veterans can effectively work to regulate prices for veterans.  
On the other hand, legislation that does not cover all patients 
using a particular drug, but only those in particular government 
 
 257.  There is much evidence in the market that such practices are already being 
employed. See Editorial Board, No Justification for High Drug Prices, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/20/opinion/sunday/no-justification-for-
high-drug-prices.html. 
 258.  BARNES & BURKE, supra note 33, at 52. 
ZWIER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2016  9:42 AM 
248    BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 17.2 
programs, can end up pushing on to private insurers the high 
prices of the drugs.  However, where the class allows negotiation 
for drug pricing regardless of the special characteristics of 
patients, price moderation cannot be passed on to other 
consumers.  As a result, unlike the initial politics of providing 
Disability Insurance, which pitted businesses against those with 
disabilities, the high price of drugs affects the size of government 
expenditures paid for by public dollars.  The dollars paid are not 
a zero-sum game between different classes of patients, but are 
funded by moderating the profits of an already enormously 
profitable industry.  Barnes and Burke show that this very 
problem was overcome in the case of SSDI through the actions of 
individual states, arguing the unfair effects on state Medicare 
funds, if the federal government did not address the problem 
uniformly.259  Class action certifications can remedy the state-by-
state unfairness of different pricing under different plans in 
different states, and still be a result of direct negotiations between 
patients and drug companies in light of the prices originally 
charged, and those charged after the takeover. 
In addition, the effect of a class action price moderation will 
send signals to the market for similar drugs to voluntarily 
moderate their prices.  The moderated effect of the tort system on 
business behavior will operate like it did in the case of bad faith 
insurance practices.  We turn, in Part V, to the case of the law of 
bad faith insurance to see how an integrated approach might lead 
to a moderation of all drug prices in the U.S. market. 
Finally, this Essay argues that the lessons learned from bad 
faith insurance law are predictors of the effect of adversarial 
litigation in the case of exorbitant drug prices and not the problem 
of individualism. 
V. THE DEVELOPMENT OF BAD FAITH LAW 
There are a number of reasons to consider the history of the 
development of bad faith insurance law as a bellwether for 
developing policy in relation to exorbitant pricing of lifesaving 
drugs.  First, its history demonstrates the public need for 
protection against the emotional harm caused by shady business 
practices designed to take advantage of individuals during a 
crisis, whether because they are injured, disabled, suffered a loss 
from theft or fire, or the death of a spouse or parent.260  Second, it 
 
 259.  Id. 
 260.  Mark J. Browne, Ellen S. Pryor & Bob Puelz, The Effect of Bad-Faith Laws 
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shows how early bad faith regulatory legislation failed because it 
lacked the teeth that litigation can provide to change behavior.261  
Third, it shows the continued shortcoming that a state-by-state 
approach takes, absent some nationally coordinated legislation 
designed to guard against the most egregious practices.262 
The first wave of change against extreme insurance practices 
came, not from the courts, but from state legislatures.263  Still, 
states were not all quick to adopt protections.  As of 1951, only 
one quarter of the states enacted legislation that provided for 
attorney’s fees and penalties in those cases where insurance 
companies “engaged in denying insured’s claims in bad faith.”264  
Such legislation was enacted to provide recovery in instances 
where insurers defaulted on their obligations to pay benefits.265  
Then, in the 1970s, the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC) created legislation that was meant to 
address claim settlements.  Mary Cryar, in her article, If We Knew 
Then What We Know Now – The Evolution of Insurance Bad Faith, 
provides that the legislation: 
1. Only prohibited certain acts when the insurer acts 
flagrantly and in conscious disregard or if it 
commits such acts so often as render it a general 
business practice. 
2. Silent as to any remedies for individual claimants. 
 
on First-Party Insurance Claims Decisions, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 355, 355-56 (2004); 
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Pryor & Charles Silver, Symposium on the Law of Bad Faith in Contract and 
Insurance, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1203, 1203-07 (1994). For analyses of the various costs and 
benefits of a tort-based cause of action for bad faith denials of first-party claims, see 
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK 183-88 (1986); Mark Gergen, A Cautionary 
Tale About Contractual Good Faith in Texas, 72 TEX. L. REV. 125, 125-36 (1994); 
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 261.  See Kenneth S. Abraham, The Natural History of the Insurer’s Liability for 
Bad Faith, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1295, 1298-1300 (1994). 
 262.  Id. 
 263.  Michael E. DeBow, The Intersection of Insurance Bad Faith Litigation and 
State Insurance Regulation: A Reconsideration, GEORGE MASON SCHOOL OF LAW, LAW 
& ECONOMICS CENTER 1, 1 (2015), available at 
http://www.masonlec.org/site/rte_uploads/files/DEBOW_Bad-Faith-paper-1-1-1.pdf. 
 264.  Mary K. Cryar, If We Knew Then What We Know Now—The Evolution of 
Insurance Bad Faith, Insurance Bad Faith and Extra-Contractual Liability (June 
2013) 1, 4, available at www.dri.org/DRI/course-materials/2013-
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 265.  Id.  
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3. Only enables state insurance regulators to seek 
injunctive relief or penalties as a way to enforce 
the regulations.266 
Additionally, Cryar provides that “[t]he majority of courts 
have held this legislation does not create a private right of action 
for insureds,”267 and that it was unsuccessful in assisting 
insureds.268 
As a result of the failures of legislation, courts started to 
develop ways in which insureds would receive remedies in their 
actions. 
Social pressure pushed for relief from unjustified 
delays in processing and arbitrary refusals to pay 
claims, and insureds began utilizing private attorneys 
to advance their interests.  This forced the courts to 
finally take a serious look at the claims process and 
eventually gave rise to the common-law tort or bad 
faith that we have today.269 
The “first development in bad faith” came from:  
[T]he third-party insurance arena.  Originally, 
liability policies as we know them today did not exist.  
Rather, third party insurance was via indemnity 
policies . . . [that] only obligated the insurer to pay 
monies to a third party if two requirements were met.  
One, the insured had to have been held liable and two, 
the insured actually had to have paid the judgment to 
the third party.  If the insured was insolvent, or for 
some other reason, did not pay the third party, the 
insurer had no obligation to pay any amount.  The tort 
victim similarly had no remedy against the insurer.  
Liability policies, on the other hand, obligate the 
insurer to pay the third party once the liability has 
been established, without any requirement that 
insured first pay the victim.270 
Indemnity policies eventually: 
[V]anished from the third party arena, and were 
replaced with liability policies.  Why?  The public was 
not satisfied with indemnity policies.  It offended 
 
 266.  Id. at 6. 
 267.  Id. 
 268.  Id. 
 269.  Id. 
 270.  Id. 
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common sense for the insurer to avoid liability solely 
because the insured could not pay the judgment first.  
Sometimes, insurers even colluded with insureds to 
secure and adjudication of bankruptcy for the latter so 
the insurer could avoid its obligations under an 
indemnity policy.  This pressure gave rise to court and 
legislative action.  State legislatures began enacting 
“direct action” statutes.  Courts began construing 
indemnity policies like liability policies, absent clear 
policy language that limited the insurer’s obligation to 
paying what the insurer paid the tort victim.  Courts 
also began holding insurers to be estopped from 
denying any obligation to pay third party claimants 
once the insurer assumed control of the defense.271 
Cryar further opined: 
As a result of these changes, indemnity policies 
gradually disappeared, leaving insurers issuing 
liability policies, which contained language that 
permitted the development of third party bad faith 
actions.  First party bad faith took over.  An insurance 
relationship was seen as one in which the insured 
sought security.  Like good health insurance, it 
protected the accumulation of savings from one’s 
lifetime of labor against the vagaries of accidents and 
disease.  It was not obtained for commercial 
advantage, but is instead protection against a 
calamity.  The consequences of the breach of an 
insurance contract by the insurer were broader than 
merely not receiving payment.  Instead, the insured 
who did not promptly receive payment would suffer 
financial harm and even more importantly to this 
discussion, emotional distress.  To recover, the insured 
may have to incur attorney’s fees.272 
Most jurisdictions adopted a cause of action for bad faith in 
first party insurance.273  But each state’s law is marked by unique 
aspects that require considerable care in determining “the law” in 
a given state.  Cryar divided the jurisdictions into categories: 
1. Some jurisdictions refuse to recognize a cause of 
action for first-party and bad faith and have no or 
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limited statutory remedies for violation of claims 
practice standards. 
2. About half, or perhaps fewer than half, uses a 
variation of the [rule against acting] unreasonable 
or without proper cause. 
3. A larger group, such as in Iowa, use some version 
of “fairly debatable” rule. . . . 
4. Others, such as Utah, while recognizing bad faith, 
have tied it to its contract roots, rather than 
creating a tort action. 
5. Many jurisdictions have enacted statutes which 
define bad faith or prohibit unfair claim practices, 
such as in Georgia and Louisiana.274 
 
What lessons can be learned from this history of Bad Faith 
Insurance Law that can map onto our analysis of the exorbitant 
pricing situation? 
 Even where state insurance regulators already were in 
place, enforcement was uneven.275 
 Unless specific remedies are provided for in legislation, 
courts may be uncomfortable with making market 
decisions about “fair” practices.  Still, where the price had 
been set and a new owner raises that price, the 
unreasonableness of such pricing is more easily proven.276 
 As the U.S. shifts to a national health insurance system 
that seeks to provide universal coverage, court oversight is 
needed to prevent insurers from taking advantage of 
insureds in emergency situations.277  Just as it is bad faith, 
and a breach of the very reason for health insurance—to 
protect against catastrophic losses, including emotional 
distress and anxiety threatened by the loss of life savings 
for insurance companies to threaten non-payment, 
impossible notice requirements, penalty clauses, or raising 
rates or deductibles during a coverage period, it is similarly 
bad faith for a drug company to effect the same losses—
financial and emotional—by raising prices. 
 Insurance itself will become too expensive if prices of drugs 
are raised arbitrarily high in the middle of their coverage 
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cycle.278 
 Without granting a private cause of action, the regulation 
is not likely to be effective.279 
 If state court definitions vary, multistate class actions are 
not likely to be granted.280 
Finally, then, state-by-state legislative fixes will present 
difficulties for all patients seeking a lowering of prices of their 
drugs.  While the U.S. litigation systems provide fixes for these 
problems, a nationwide regulatory body may be necessary to 
regulate the drug companies’ behavior.  For example, multi-
district litigation (MDL) procedures provide courts a path to 
coordinate and consolidate cases involving patients adversely 
affected by product defects in medical devices.281  The same can 
be employed to coordinate pricing problems with drugs; yet 
coordination problems and conflict of laws and interests problems 
proliferate in MDLs. 
In the event that tort law does not find its way to a remedy, 
then legislation should be enacted to moderate the pricing of 
lifesaving drugs in the U.S.  The experience of state development 
of rules against bad faith insurance practices and breaches of 
covenants of good faith and fair dealing should be instructive in 
this regard.  By providing for attorney’s fees and punitive 
damages, legislation can also provide incentives to the private 
attorney general provisions of tort law, to effectively discipline the 
market as a whole.282  On the other hand, current Supreme Court 
rulings restrict the awarding of punitive damages by a state court 
to conduct occurring within that state.283  It will also provide the 
incentives to keep an eye out for creative attempts at exacting fees 
and prices that take advantage of emergency contexts inherent in 
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 279.  Id. 
 280.  Id. 
 281.  See, e.g., DePuy Orthopedics, Inc., ASR Hip Implant Products Liability 
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the market for lifesaving drugs.  These regulations reveal the 
same tensions in the law and free market between fundamental 
belies in a liberal society that pricing should be set by the maker 
of a product, and yet the government needs to regulate where 
there exists emergencies and where producers lack the morality 
required to protect against extortionate practices.  These 
regulations and subsequent common law adaptations will provide 
a road map for similar efforts by the states to develop regulations 
against exorbitant prices of lifesaving drugs. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As we have seen, tort law principles provide a remedy to 
moderate exorbitant pricing of lifesaving drugs.  On the other 
hand, requirements of “severity of emotional distress” might 
make it difficult for courts to certify classes of cases in order to get 
at the common vulnerability interest that is violated by such 
behavior.  In addition, courts worrying about whether they are 
legislating may balk at extending legal duties through affirmative 
duty and negligence doctrines.  Perhaps courts will adopt creative 
approaches to these situations and allow cases to be brought by a 
class of plaintiffs similarly impacted by the exorbitant pricing.  
Once certified, an injunction threatening the price increases could 
generate the necessary leverage to moderate pricing through 
negotiations between patients and drug makers. 
Important policy considerations dictate that the courts 
should not wait for the legislature to deal with the problem.  
Adversarial litigation grounds pricing moderation in well-
established precedents of common law tort, whether IIED or 
NIED that should at least warrant the formation of a class action 
and consideration of injunctions or other equitable remedies.  
Waiting will not create bad policies, path dependencies, backlash, 
or problems of individualization because the nature of the pricing 
problem is not a zero sum game.  The pricing of drugs by takeover 
artists does not relate to costs of development.  Vague promises to 
use of profits for the development of future drugs are too 
tangential to justify the effect on the price paid by the patient, and 
by the public generally, as well as their effect on depletion of the 
life savings of individual patients.284  It constitutes unjust 
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enrichment rather than providing for necessary incentive for the 
development of the drugs.  In addition, the price negotiated is not 
set by a bureaucracy, and not subject to potential capture by 
industry, or corruption from payoffs or kickbacks.  The price gets 
negotiated by the patients’ representatives, supervised by the 
courts, and advised by experts on both sides, seeking to make the 
case for fair pricing. 
Absent such innovation, the remedy for exorbitant pricing 
may lie in legislation that is patterned on Bad Faith Insurance 
legislation.  On the other hand, such legislation will be ineffective 
unless an administrative agency is authorized with its 
enforcement.  Since it is unlikely that the FDA would be 
empowered in this regard, perhaps the best regulator may be 
Medicare.  Empowering CMS to regulate pricing for Medicare 
creates its own individualization problems, potentially causing 
higher prices to be put off on private insurers provided by 
employers.  This will soon being about the end of private 
employer-provided plans and the political and economic 
consequences could signal the end of national health insurance. 
In the short run, an adversarial litigation approach is the 
next best alternative and can be developed under existing 
doctrines of tort law, existing procedures for class certification, 
and under existing remedies.  For maximum effectiveness, 
Congress should enact national legislation that explicitly gives 
patients standing to bring suit, and provides private enforcement 
actions that include rights to class certification, attorneys’ fees, 
injunctions, and punitive damages.  Such legislation can insure 
that the courts avoid the pitfalls of bad faith insurance legislation.  
It also avoids the problems of bureaucratic solutions that languish 
without agency resources to withstand industry capture.  It 
remedies delays and inaction of government regulatory schemes 
that cause emotional harm to patients, and enriches and rewards 
those most immoral actors in the market for lifesaving drugs. 
 
 
average American’s retirement savings by age. The results showed that the savings 
would be: $16,000 for people in their 20s, $45,000 for people in their 30s, $62,000 for 
people in their 40s, $117,000 for people in their 50s, and $172,000 for people in their 
60s. Transamerica Center for Retirement Studies, 16th Annual Transamerica 
Retirement Survey: A Compendium of Findings About American Workers (Aug. 2015), 
http://www.transamericacenter.org/docs/default-source/resources/center-
research/16th-annual/tcrs2015_sr_16th_compendium_of_workers.pdf. 
